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et al.: Recent Cases

Recent Cases
CHARITABLE TRUSTSVALIDITY OF DEVISES TO UNSPECIFIED CHARITIES
Yeager v. Johns1
Sadie Donahoe died testate August 17, 1968, leaving a residuary estate
in excess of $50,000. Article X of her will devised the residue "to the
Reverend H.J. Lambert, to be used by him at his discretion for religious and
educational purposes."2 On challenge by the heirs of the testatrix, the circuit
court held that article X of the will was invalid because the beneficiaries of
the purported charitable trust were so uncertain and unascertainable that the
intentions of testatrix could not be followed with certainty.3 Appealing to
the supreme court, proponents of the will alleged that article X created a
valid charitable trust by authorizing a trustee who was ready, willing and
able to act to select at his discretion religious and educational purposes. 4 In
addition, the proponents argued that vesting this discretion in the trustee
was not impractical because a court of equity can compel the trustee to
exercise his power to appoint religious and educational organizations as
beneficiaries and can prevent a diversion from the purposes stated in the
will.5 The supreme court upheld the devise.8
From 1860, when Missouri adopted the English law of charitable trusts
by judicial decision,7 until 1917, the Missouri Supreme Court consistently
upheld the validity of devises in trust to be used in the trustee's discretion
for unspecified charitable purposes.8 Indefiniteness or uncertainty as to the
beneficiaries was not considered a serious defect because the trustee could
make the charitable purposes certain.9 In 1917, however, the supreme court
1. 484 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1972).
2. Id. at 212.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 213.

5. Id.

6. Id. at 215.
7. Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 548 (1860).
8. For an historical discussion of the validity of powers of appointment to
unspecified charities in Missouri see Fratcher, Powers of Appointment to Unspecified Charities,32 Mo. L. REv. 443, 451-58 (1967).
9. The following devises in trust were held valid: Sandusky v. Sandusky,
261 Mo. 351, 168 S.W. 1150 (1914) ("for the general advancement of Christianity"); Sappington v. Sappington School Fund Trustees, 123 Mo. 32, 27 S.W. 356
(1894) (to "apply the interest of said fund to such other objects of charity in
said county as in their judgment may be most needy"); Powell v. Hatch, 100 Mo.
592, 14 S.W. 49 (1890) ("such charitable purposes as my said trustee may deem
best"); Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45, 3 S.W. 390 (1886) (to divide the trust
funds "among such charitable institutions of the city of St. Louis, Missouri, as
he shall deem worthy"); Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543 (1860) ("to
furnish relief to all poor emigrants and travelers coming to St. Louis on their way,
(51)
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in Jones v. Patterson0 held invalid a devise to an executor "to be used for
missionary purposes in whatever field he thinks best to use it, so it is done
in the name of my dear Savior and for the salvation of souls," because the
will failed to provide the particular form of Christianity to be advanced, the
class of persons to be benefitted, or the form of benfit they were to receive."
In addition, dictum in a 1928 Missouri case stated that a bequest "to such
2
charitable uses and purposes as [the executor] may determine" was void.1
As authority for its holding in Jones v. Patterson, the court relied on
Morice v. The Bishop of Durham,3 which held that private trusts would
fail if the beneficiaries were not definitely ascertainable from the terms of
the instrument creating the trust. In addition to misapplying the Morice rule,
the court failed to consider an English case decided just prior to Morice4
which held that a power of appointment to unspecified charities was valid.'
Nor did the court follow dicta in Morice which stated that if any of the
trust property had been devoted to charity the trust would be valid to
that extent.' 5
bona fide, to settle in the west"); See Fratcher, supra note 8, at 451-54.
But see Hadley v. Forsee, 203 Mo. 418, 101 S.W. 59 (1907); Corby v.
Corby, 85 Mo. 371 (1884); Schrnucker's Estate v. Reel, 61 Mo. 592 (1876); each
of which may be distinguished. In Schmucker's Estate the executor was devised
"two hundred dollars, to be applied to a specific purpose which I [testator]
explained to him" and "five hundred dollars for another and specific charitable
purpose which he well understands" and the residue "to apply to charity, according to his best discretion." The trust failed because the instructions were unwritten.
The court said the trust could not be upheld where decedent made no memorandum in accordance with the oral instructions. In Corby the residuary clause of
testator's will provided "that the balance of my said property will be given to
advance the cause of religion and promote the cause of charity, in such manner
as my dearly beloved wife may think will be most conducive to the carrying out
my wishes." The trust failed because it could not be definitely ascertained what
testator's wishes were. In Hadley the Attorney General sued to establish a charitable trust in accordance with the residuary clause in the will under attack in
Corby. The court dismissed the suit on the ground that the testator intended
particular charities named to his wife outside the will which, because of her death,
could no longer be ascertained. The court also said there was no way to know
whether the wife was carrying out testator's directives since it was impossible to

tell what religion or charity the testator intended. Hence the gift was impossible
of execution.
10. 271 Mo. 1, 195 S.W. 1004; see Annot., 1917F L.R.A. 660.

11. 271 Mo. at 3, 195 S.W. at 1005.
12. Wentura v. Kinnerk, 319 Mo. 1068, 5 S.W.2d 66 (1928). But see
Kinnerk v. Smith, 328 Mo. 513, 524, 41 S.W.2d 881, 886 (1931), wherein the

supreme court recognized this language in Wentura as dictum; Gossett v.
Swinney, 53 F.2d 772, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 545 (1932),
aff'g Irwin v. Swinney, 44 F.2d 172 (W.D. Mo. 1980), wherein the court states
the language in Wentura "was based apparently upon a misapprehension of the
rule announced in ...Morice v. The Bishop of Durham . ..."
13. 10 Ves. Jun. 521, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805), affirming the decree of Sir
William Grant, Master of the Rolls, 9 Ves. Jun. 399, 32 Eng. Rep. 656 (1804).
14. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jun. 86,82 Eng. Rep. 15 (1803).
15, 10 Ves. Jun. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947, 954 (1805), affirming the decree
of Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls, 9 Ves. Jun. 399, 32 Eng. Rep. 656

(1804).
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The court also relied on early New York and Virginia decisions'6 that
had invalidated charitable trusts because of indefiniteness of beneficiaries,
even though those cases were inconsistent with Missouri cases 17 of that
period. In New York charitable trusts were treated the same as private
trusts,18 and in Virginia it had been held that the same degree of certainty
of beneficiaries was required for charitable trust as for private trusts.'9
Jones v. Patterson has caused continuing confusion in the law of charitable trusts in Missouri. Later cases have upheld the creation of powers
of appointment to unspecified charities2 0 and devises in trust for broad,
though not unspecified, charitable purposes, 2' but Jones has not been
overruled and continues to offer
a viable ground for attack to those who
22
would defeat the charitable gift.

16. Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891); Fifield v. Van Wyck,
94 Va. 557, 27 S.E. 446 (1897).
17. Cases cited note 9 supra.
18. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 589, 589 (1867), referring to
Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584 (1866). The English law of charitable trusts
had been wholly abrogated by statute.
19. Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 1 (1819) (applying Virginia law); annot., 163 A.L.R. 784 (1946).
20. Altman v. McCutchen, 210 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1948) (testator's will gave
the executor "unlimited discretion" to dispose of the proceeds of testators property
"to the charitable and other institutions devoted to the alleviation of human
suffering and want."
21. Gossett v. Swinney, 53 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286
U.S. 545 (1932), aff'g Irwin v. Swinney, 44 F.2d 172 (W.D. Mo. 1930)
(devise gave trustees the residue for "such charitable, benevolent, hospital,
infirmary, public, educational, scientific, literary, library or research purpose in
Kansas City, Missouri, as said Trustees shall in their absolute discretion determine
to be in the public interest."); Epperly v. Mercantile Trust, 415 S.W.2d 819 (Mo.
1967) ("I leave to the discretion of my Trustees the distribution of the income to
Protestant churches and religious organizations but direct that the gifts be used
to save souls and not to build buildings or to improve existing buildings.");
Standley v. Allen, 849 Mo. 1115, 163 S.W.2d 1012 (1942) (Two devises: one
to a trustee "for the purpose of having him dispose of the same to some worthy
charitable organization, in Missouri, to be selected by him; provided, if at said
time there shall be in Southwestern Missouri, a home for aged people, I charge
my trustee with the duty of transferring the said trust estate to said Institution";
the other to a trustee "with the duty of disposing of said balance of my estate to
some worthy charitable organization in Missouri, and the preference to be given
to aged people."); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little, 820 Mo. 1058, 10 S.W.2d
47 (1928) (devise to an individual "to be spent on the welfare of poor, homeless
children.")
22. Thus, the will opponent in Yeager, relying on Jones and other cases,
attempted to distinguish the devise in Epperly v. Mercantile Trust, 415 S.W.2d
819 (Mo. 1967) (discussed note 21 supra), to "Protestant churches" as establishing a sufficiently specific class of beneficiaries, whereas a devise to "religious
and educational purposes" did not. Epperly itself made this argument possible by
distinguishing Jones in vague and overly narrow terms. "Where, as here, a trust
provision gives to the trustee discretion in applying the trust property to the
specified charitable purpose, the rules in Jones v. Patterson . . . should *not be
followed." Id. at 822.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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A charitable trust may be created in a will or deed by any expression
of the testator's intention; technical words are not required-m Furthermore,
equity favors charitable trusts because of the benefits they yield to society
and liberally construes them to give them effect whenever possible. 24 Valid
charitable objects include the relief of poverty and the advancement of
education, religion, science, the arts, health, governmental projects, or any
other purposes that benefits the community. 25 In general, a trustee appointed
to select charitable objects need not be restricted to a definite group or
class 20 nor must the beneficiaries be definitely ascertainable, 7 since the
28
testator has provided the means of making certain that which is uncertain.

28. A charitable intent need only be ascertained from the terms of the instruBOcERT, LAW OF TRUST § 66 (1968); SCOTT, TRUSTS § 851 (2d ed.
1956); 15 Am. Jun. 2D Charities § 18 (1964); 14 C.J.S. Charities § 5 (1989).
24. First Natl Bank v. Jacques, 470 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Mo. 1971); First
Nat'l Bank v. Stevenson, 298 S.W.2d 862, 867 (Mo. 1956); Taylor v. Baldwin,
362 Mo. 1224, 1240, 247 S.W.2d 741, 749 (En Banc 1952); Burrier v. Jones,
838 Mo. 679, 685, 92 S.W.2d 887 (En Bano 1986); 15 Am. Jun. 2D Charities
§ 105 (1964); 14 C.J.S. Charities§ 6 (1989); 50 CAL. L. REv. 885 (1962); 54
. L. REv. 486, 464 (1968).
25. Gossett v. Swinney, 58 F.2d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
286 U.S. 545 (1982); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 868 (2d ed. 1964);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TRUSTS § 368 (1959); 14 C.J.S. Charities § la
(1939); 15 Am. Jun. 2D Charities§ 57 (1964).
26. Russel v. Allen, 107 U.S. 168 (1882); Gossett v. Swinney, 58 F.2d 772,
782-88 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 545 (1982); Epperly v. Mercantile Trust, I., 415 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo. 1967); Voelker v. St. Louis Mercantile
Library Ass'n, 859 S.W.2d 689, 696 (Mo. 1962); Newton v. Newton Burial Park,
826 Mo. 901, 909, 84 S.W.2d 118, 120, 121 (1930); St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v, Little, 820 Mo. 1058, 1070, 10 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1928); Chambers v. City of
St. Louis, 29 Mo. 548, 589-90 (1860); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 864
(1959); Fratcher, Bequests for Purposes,56 IowA L. REv. 778, 774 (1971).
See also Fratcher, supra note 8, at 449, indicating a power to appoint to
unspecified charities has been held valid by the vast majority of American decisions even though the power has not been conferred upon a trustee. The cases
are collected in ScoTT, TnusTs §§ 895-97 (2d ed. 1956).
27. Gossett v. Swinney, 58 F.2d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286
U,S. 545 (1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Jacques, 470 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Mo. 1971);
Ramsey v. City of Brookfield, 861 Mo. 857, 861, 287 S.W.2d 148, 145 (1951);
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little, 820 Mo. 1058, 1070, 10 S.W.2d 47, 49
(1928); RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 864 (1959).
28. Gossett v. Swinney, 58 F.2d 772, 782-88 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
286 U.S. 545 (1932); Epperly v. Mercantile Trust, 415 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo.
1967); Altman v. McCutchen, 210 S.W.2d 68, 67 (Mo. 1948); Standley v. Allen,
849 Mo. 1115, 163 S.W.2d 1012 (1942) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TnRsTs § 396, Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45 (1886) & Powell v. Hatch, 100 Mo.
592, 14 S.W. 49 (1890)); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little, 820 Mo. 1058,
1070, 10 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1928); Sappington v. Sappington School Fund Trustees,
128 Mo. 82, 42, 27 S.W. 856, 858 (1894); Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45, 52
(1886); Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jun. 86b, 82 Eng. Rep. 15 (1808);
G. BOGERT, TRUSTS Am TRUSTEES § 876 (2d ed. 1964); ScoTT, TRus Ts §§ 89597 (2d ed. 1956); Fratcher, supra note 7 at 449; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TntusTS § 896; 15 Am JuR. 2D Charities § 94 (1964); Annot., 168 A.L.R. 784
(1946); Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1850 (1947).

ment. G.
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There are three persuasive reasons for upholding unspecified charitable
devises in trust against attacks of indefiniteness and uncertainty. The first
is to effectuate the testator's intent to benefit charity. 29 If the devise is
invalidated, the clause will lapse and the trust property will pass under
the residuary clause. If the devise was in the residuary clause the trust
property will descend to the heirs at law, perhaps benefitting distant relatives and unlikely objects 6f the testator's bounty.
Second, by upholding devises in trust to unspecified charities courts
promote the public welfare. The advancement of the arts, science, religion
and education rendered by the enforcement of such devises surely outweighs
any problems of enforcement. Devises in trust to unspecified charities
provides desireable flexibility in the selection of charitable uses. 0 A trustee
may select charitable objects which he deems worthy and is able to later
adapt his selections to the changing needs of his community without
invoking the doctrine of cy pres. 31
Finally, adequate protection is afforded charitable trusts by the supervisory powers of a court of equity. Although the court itself usually does not
select a charitable object,82 it may enforce the trust by compelling the
trustee to make a selection.8 3 Also, equity can intercede to prevent the
trustee from diverting the res to noncharitable3 5 purposes3 4 and replace a
trustee unwilling to properly perform his duties.
29. A fundamental rule of construction in interpreting wills is that testator's
intent should be given effect if possible. ScoTT, TnusTs § 396 (2d ed. 1956);
16 U. DETrOT L. J. 199, 201 (1953). If a testator has indicated in the terms of
the will a charitable intent, that will be given effect so long as the will does not
fail for some other reason. Teller v. Kaufman, 298, F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Mo.
1968), aff'd, 426 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1970); Stuesse v. Stuesse, 377 S.W.2d 389
(Mo. 1964); First Natl Bank v. Stevenson, 293 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1956); Atkinson, Wills § 146 (1953); 57 Am. JuR. Wills § 1133 (1948); 95 C.J.S. Wills

§ 591 (1957).
30. Gossett v. Swinney, 53 F.2d 772, 783 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286

U.S. 545 (1982).

81. Bogert, The Community Trust: A Service Opportunity for Lawyers, 41
A.B.A.J. 587 (1955).
32. Gossett v. Swinney, 53 F.2d 772, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
286 U.S. 545 (1932); Epperly v. Mercantile Trust, 415 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo.
1967); Altman v. McCutchen, 210 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Mo. 1948); Thatcher v. City

of St. Louis, 843 Mo. 597, 602, 122 S.W.2d 915, 916-17 (1938); Howe v.

Wilson, 91 Mo. 45, 52 (1886); Fratcher, Bequests for Purposes, 56 Iowa L. Rev.

778, 774 (1971); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 891 (1959).
83. 484 S.W.2d at 215.
84. Gossett v. Swinney, 53 F.2d 772, 783 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
286 U.S. 545 (1932); Epperly v. Mercantile Trust, 415 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo.
1967); Altman v. McCutchen, 210 S.W.2d 68, 67 (Mo. 1948); Howe v. Wilson,

91 Mo. 45, 49 (1886).

85. Epperly v. Mercantile Trust, 415 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo. 1967); Carlock

v. Ladies Cemetery Ass'n, 317 S.W.2d 482, 440 (Mo. 1958); Taylor v. Baldwin,

362 Mo. 1224, 1240-41, 247 S.W.2d 741, 750 (En Bane 1952); Newton v.
Newton Burial Park, 826 Mo. 901, 910, 34 S.W.2d 118, 121 (1930); Dickey v.
Volker, 321 Mo. 285, 250, 11 S.W.2d 278, 283 (En Bane 1928); G. BOGEMT,
TRusTs AND TnusTEs § 328 (2d ed. 1964); Scorr, TRusTs § 897 (2d ed. 1956);

14 C.J.S. Charities § 49 (1989).
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In Yeager v. Johns the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the validity of
Sadie Donahoe's devise in trust for "religious and educational purposes."
The holding is consistent with the majority position and the recent trend of
decisions in the United States.8 6 The court did not eliminate, however, the
confusion regarding devises in trust to unspecified charitable purposes by
overruling Jones v. Patterson and clarifying that Morice v. The Bishop of
Durham applies only to private trusts. But it is probable that the effect
of the decision is to do both, so that now a devise in trust "for charitable
purposes" or "for charity" should be valid in Missouri. This result will
promote flexibility in the exercise of charitable trusts, prevent unwarranted
and vexatious attacks on similar devises, effectuate the testator's intent, and
promote public welfare through the advancement of the arts, science, religion and education.
RoBERT B. Mn'ER
LANDLORD-TENANT: IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF HABITABILITY IN LEASES
King v. Moorehead'
Plaintiff a landlord sued in magistrate court for possession and past
due rent which he claimed was owing to him pursuant to a month-to-month
lease of a single family dwelling in Kansas City, Missouri. Defendant admitted that she had occupied plaintiffs premises without paying rent from
May 6, 1969, to August 1, 1969, but interposed, in an appeal to the circuit
court2 , two defenses to the action for the past due rent. First, she claimed
she was not liable under the lease because it was an illegal contract in
violation of the local housing code8 in the following respects: rodent and
vermin infestation, defective and dangerous electrical wiring, a leaking
roof, and unsafe ceilings. Defendant's second defense was that she was
relieved of her duty to pay rent because the landlord had substantially
breached an alleged implied covenant of habitability. The circuit court
disallowed both defenses as being legally insufficient.
On appeal, the Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, stating that both defenses were valid.
This is an abrupt departure from prior Missouri cases 4 that have
consistently held that the doctrines of caveat emptor and independent
covenants in leases bar the result reached in King. Under the aegis of
caveat emptor it has been held that a landlord does not warrant his buildings

86. Cases are collected in ScoTT, TRusts §§ 395-397 (2d ed. 1956); 16 U.

L.J. 199 (1953). Accord, RsTATEm:ENT (SEcoND) oF TRUSTS §§ 395-97
(1959: See also Annot., 163 A.L.R. 784 (1946); Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1350
1. 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1973).
2. Sections 512.180, .270, RSMo 1969, provide that a cause appealed from
the magistrate court shall be tried anew by the circuit court, without regard to
error in the magistrate trial.
3. KNsAs CiTY, Mo., CoDE OF GEr. On INANCES, ch. 20 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Houfburg v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 283 S.W.2d 539
DET.
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to be habitable and that he has no duty to repair.5 Under the doctrine of
independent covenants even the landlord's express covenant to repair has
been held to be merely incidental to the conveyance and therefore independent of the tenant's promise to pay rent.6 Thus, if the landlord breached his
covenant, the tenant still had an obligation to pay rent; his only remedy was
to sue for damages. 7
These rules were derived from old English concepts developed in an
agrarian society in which land was much more important than the buildings
on it.8 At their inception, the validity of these doctrines rested on a common
understanding that a tenant was in an equal bargaining position with the
landlord. The doctrines contemplated that the parties dealt at arms length
and that the tenant could inspect the premises before leasing. Let the buyer
9
beware for "there [was] no law against letting a tumble-down house."
The English view remained the general rule in Missouri and elsewhere. 10 As society changed from agrarian to urban, however, the purpose
of the modem lease became to secure habitable dwelling. 1 Recognizing
this, the judiciary began to create exceptions to these common law property
rules based on the more flexible principles of contract law.
An early exception to caveat emptor in leases was the covenant of
quiet enjoyment.' 2 This covenant is breached when a landlord evicts his
tenant without just cause. The duty to pay rent is then suspended.1 3
From this exception came the doctrine of constructive eviction.14 This
doctrine provides a remedy when a landlord's act or omission substantially
interferes' 5 with the tenant's quiet enjoyment without amounting to an
actual eviction. Here also, the tenant's covenant to pay rent is suspended' 1
for the period following abandonment of the premises.17 In one case,' 8 a
(Mo. 1955); Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 38 S.W.2d 57 (1931); Croskey
v. Shawnee Realty Co., 225 S.W.2d 509 (K.C. Mo. App. 1949).
5. See cases cited note 4 supra; see generally 2 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF
REAL PioPER'TY § 233 (Rohan ed. 1971).
6. 6 S. WILLSTON, CoNTRAcrs § 890, at 634 (8d ed. 1962).
7. See, e.g., Means v. Dierks, 180 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1950).
8. 2 R.POWELL, supra note 5, at § 221.

9. Robbins v. Jones, 143 Eng. Rep. 768, 776 (Ex. 1863).
10. See O'Neil v. Flanagan, 64 Mo. App. 87 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895); Burnes
v. Fuchs, 28 Mo. App. 279 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887).
11. Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971).
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 216 S.W.2d 499 (Mo.
1949).
13. Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 209, 212 (1848); Dolph v. Barry, 165 Mo.
App. 659. 667, 148 S.W. 196, 198 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912).
14. Dolph v. Barry, 165 Mo. App. 659, 668-69, 148 S.W. 196, 198 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1912); Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826).
15. 45 U. Mo. BULL. L. SEn. 41 (1931).

16. Cases cited note 14 supra.
17. Dolph v. Barry, 165 Mo. App. 659, 671-73, 148 S.W. 196, 198-200
(St. L. Ct. App. 1912). The abandonment requirement makes this remedy inadequate for low income tenants in times of severe housing shortages because another
dwelling is likely to be as uninhabitable as the last. 495 S.W.2d at 76-77.
18. Banister Real Estate Co. v. Edwards, 282 S.W. 138 (St. L. Mo. App.
1926). Severe vermin infestation may also amount to constructive eviction. See
Ray Realty Co. v. Holtzman, 234 Mo. App. 802, 811, 119 S.W.2d 981, 984
(St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Annot., 27 A.L.R.8d 924 (1969).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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was a
Missouri court indicated that breach of an express covenant to repair
0
constructive eviction and a defense to the landlord's rent action1
A New York case20 announced the doctrine of partial constructive
eviction, giving the tenant a defense to nonpayment of rent when the landlord's housing code violations deprive him of complete use of the premises.
This doctrine was rejected on appeal and has not been expressly recognized
in Missouri, However, in Dolph v. Barry2' the St. Louis Court of Appeals
of rent in a fact situation constituting a partial
allowed a partial abatement
22
constructive eviction.

Another inroad on caveat emptor is the implied warranty of fitness for
immediate habitation of furnished dwellings leased for a short period of
time.23 This exception has been justified on the grounds that the parties
intended the premises to be ready for occupation without inspection. It
is usually applied to furnished vacation houses, but has been expanded by
some courts to include ordinary leases of furnished residences. For example,
in Pines v. Perssion24 the Wisconsin Supreme Court implied a warranty of
25
habitability in the lease of a furnished house to a group of college students,
saying that the covenant to pay rent was mutually dependent upon the
20
implied covenant to provide a habitable house. Thus, the landlord's breach
at the commencement of the term partially relieved the students of the duty
to pay rent. The students recovered their security deposit and payment for
their labor expended in making improvements, but the court held them
liable for reasonable rental value 27 during their actual occupancy.

19. Banister Real Estate Co. v. Edwards, 282 S.W. 138, 140 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1926). Here, also, the court required abandonment by the tenant.
20. Gombo v. Martise, 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Civ. Ct.),
rev'd, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
21. 165 Mo. App. 659, 148 S.W. 196 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912).
22. Id. at 676, 148 S.W. at 201. This new theory is not to be confused with
actual partial eviction where the duty to pay rent is completely suspended because
of a partial ouster by the landlord. Witte v. Quinn, 38 Mo. App. 681 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1890). It is also a well established principle that a landlord has a duty to
maintain portions of the premises over which he retains control, such as common
passageways. Reinagel v. Walnuts Residence Co., 239 Mo. App. 701, 194 S.W.2d
229 (K.C.Ct. App. 1946).
23. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
24. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), noted in 45

MAIIQ.

L.

Rlv.

630 (1962).
25. In dicta, the Pines court said that current legislation such as housing
codes and health regulations had rendered the old common law rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases obsolete, and:
The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this
era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that
obnoxious legal clich6, caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent tumbledown" houses is at least a contributing cause of such problems as
urban blight, juvenile delinquency and high property taxes for conscientious landowners.
Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
26. The house was filthy, and the plumbing, heating, and wiring systems
were in violation of the local housing code. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
27, Id. at 597, 111 N.W.2d at 418. The reasonable rental value of some
slum housing may approximate the contract rent
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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Other exceptions mitigating the rule of caveat emptor include the
unfinished premises exception,28 latent defects and fraudulent nondisclosure, 29 the doctrine of conditions precedent,3 0 the implied warranty of
habitability in the sale of new houses,31 and implied warranties in the sale
32
of goods.
Some states have changed the common law rule of caveat emptor by
statutes 3 that impose duties and liabilities on landlords who fail to comply
with housing standards.
In King v. Moorehead 4 the Kansas City District of the Missouri Court
of Appeals undertook a re-examination of the common law doctrines affecting leases in Missouri, and rejected the traditional application of the doctrines of caveat emptor and independent covenants in leases. The decision is
certainly in line with the modem trend, as exemplified by the various
judicial exceptions discussed above, recent cases in other jurisdictions,3 5

28. There is an implied covenant that unfinished premises will be suitable
LAw oF PnOPERTY § 3.45 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952).
29. A tenant may recover for personal injury caused by a latent defect known
by the landlord to exist at the beginning of the lease, 52 C.J.S. Landlord and
Tenant § 417(3) (c) (1968). Failure to disclose may amount to fraud and give
the tenant the right of recission or an action for damages. Rapacz, Theories of

for the purpose leased. See 1 AmucAN

Defense When Tenants Abandon the Premises Because of the Condition Thereof,

4 DEPAuL L. REv. 173, 184-87 (1955).
30. A clause may be included in a lease expressly making the landlord's
duty to repair a condition precedent to the tenant's obligation to pay rent. This
is not a likely occurrence in low income housing, and the tenant's possession may
constitute a waiver. Rapacz, supra note 29.
31. 495 S.W.2d at 75. The King court speculated that the Missouri Supreme Court would agree with its conclusions from an analogous holding in
Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (implying
a warranty of fitness into contracts for the sale of a new home by a vendorbuilder). But, cases finding an implied warranty in the sale of a house have consistently refused to extend this doctrine to the sale of used houses. See generally,

Luckenbill, Products Liability-Implied Warranty in the Sale of a New House,

38 Mo. L. REv. 315 (1973).
32. UNwonm, Co =nRcLCAL CODE §§ 2-711, 712, 714; W. PRossER, TORTS
§ 97 (4th ed. 1971).
83. See 1 AxmmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 28, § 3.45 at 267;
B. POWELL, supra note 5, at § 283. See, e.g., ILL. RPv. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-5.1
(1969); MAnrm AcTs ch. 270 (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 239, § 8-h (Supp.
1968); N.Y. MULT. DwELL. LAw 9 304(1) (C.L.S. Supp. 1968). Some municipalities have enacted similar statutes. See also Simmons, Passion and Prudence:
Rent Withholding Under New York's Spiegal Law, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 519 (1966),
Comment, Landlord-Tenant Legislation: Revising an Old Common Law Relationship, 2 PACIC L.J. 259 (1971); Comment, Model Residential LandlordTenant Code-ProposedProceduralReforms, 25 U. Mrmam L. REv. 317 (1971).
34. 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
35. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969). The
Hawaii Supreme Court refused to apply the vacation house exception and instead
relied on an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. Caveat emptor
was rejected. Id. at 432, 462 P.2d at 473.
See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), noted in 84 HAXv. L. RMv. 729 (1971), 66 Nw.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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consumer protection law,3 6 and legislative policy. 37 It is also reasonable in
view of the superiority of the landlord's bargaining position in contemporary
housing shortages, 8 and the landlord's presumably superior knowledge of
defects in his property.3 9
In 1969 the Missouri legislature enacted the Enforcement of Minimum
Housing Code Standards Act. 40 Pursuant to this statute, if a landlord fails
to correct a housing code violation within a reasonable time after notice,
an enforcement agency or specified number of tenants can collect rent and
encumber the property to make the repairs. King stated that this statute
effectively reads into every residential lease a standard of habitability based
on the local housing code and coerces landlords to make repairs for the
health and safety of their tenants.
King viewed a lease as creating an ordinary contractual relationship.
The court stated:
[A] lease is not only a conveyance but also gives rise to a contractual relationship between the landlord and tenant from which the
law implies a warranty of habitability and fitness by the landlord.
Under contract principles a tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his obligation to provide a
habitable dwelling during the tenancy. 41
U.L. REv. 227 (1971), and 1970 WAsH. U.L.Q. 499. The court held that a warranty of habitability, in accord with the housing regulations, is implied in leases
of urban dwellings. A breach of this warranty gives rise to the usual contract
remedies. The court stated that contract principles establish a more rational framework for apportionment of tenant-landlord responsibilities and suggested that the
principles of consumer protection cases could be applied to leases.
36. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470

(1969).

37. "The legislature must have known that unless repairs in the rooms of
the poor were made by the landlord, they would not be made by anyone." Altz v.
Leiberson, 28 N.Y. 16, 19, 134 N.E. 703, 704 (1922) (Cardozo, J.). But see
Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172,, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970), where the court
decided that the legislature did not intend for such strict standards as those in
the housing regulations to be incorporated into leases as an implied warranty of
habitability. Similarly, in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court said "[T]he assurance of adequate housing and
the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions." The King opinion also failed to consider the 1971 defeat in the Missouri
House of Representatives of proposed legislation which was intended to imply a
warranty of fitness in residential property leases. H.B. 695, 76th Mo. Legis., 1st
Sess. (1971).
38. See cases cited note 86 supra.
89. Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971); Reste
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969).
40. §§ 441.500-640, RSMo 1973 Supp. See also Annot. 40 A.L.R.Sd 821
(1971).
41. 495 S.W.2d at 75; accord, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Springs, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351,
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Kline v.
Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 180, 265
A.2d 526 (1970); Foisy v. Wyman, Wash. 2d -,
515 P.2d 160 (1973).
See also 40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971); Annot. 40 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1971).
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King makes all the traditional contract remedies available to the
tenant, i.e., recession, reformation, and damages, where the tenant can
meet the requirements: a material breach42 of the implied warranty of
habitability; notice to the landlord of all alleged hidden defects; allowance
of a reasonable time for repair by the landlord;
and, absence of wrongdoing
43
by the tenant as to this material breach.
If the King requirements are met, damages will be measured by the
difference betwen the fair rental value of the premises if they had been as
warranted and the fair rental value of the premises in their actual condition.44 Therefore, contrary to prior decisions, King allows the tenant to retain
possession of the premises without paying rent4 5 to the landlord until habitability is restored. The tenant may then set-off the difference in the landlord's action for contract rent.

42. [Materiality is] determined by factors, among others, of the nature

of the deficiency or defect, its effect on the life, health, or safety of the
tenant, length of time it persisted and the age of the structure. Minor
housing code violations which do not affect habitability wil be consideredde minimus. Also, the violation must affect the tenant's dwelling
unit or. the common areas which he uses.
495 S.W.2d at 76; accord, Reese v. Diamond Housing Corp., 259 A.2d 112
(D.C. Ct. App. 1969); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1970);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 180, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
48. 495 S.W.2d at 76. In King, the city health department inspected and
confirmed the housing code violations, but the court does not make this a requirement of the defense. Although King measures the standard of habitability by

the local housing code, it is reasonable to expect the remedy to be extended from
city slums to sub-standard housing in areas not covered by a housing code. Courts
in such areas might imply a standard based on the life, health, or safety of the
tenant.
44. If the tenant vacates, his damages for breach are limited to the benefit

of his bargain, or the value of his lease. He can counterclaim only for the difference, if any, between rental value of the premises as warranted and the contract rent for the unexpired term of the lease. Id. at 76; Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 93-94, 276 A.2d

248, 252 (1971); 11 S.

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§

1404, at 562 (3d ed. 1968);

see note 28 supra.
Justice Douglas discussed Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (See note 85 supra) in his dissent and implied that Oregon follows Javins in treating leases as contracts. The
eases he cited, however, were not expressly determined on such bold grounds:
Wright v. Bauman, 239 Ore. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965) (contract to make a
lease); Eggen v. Wetterborg, 193 Ore. 145, 237 P.2d 970 (1951) (premises
destroyed by fire, impossibility of performance).
45. "A tenant who retains possession, however, shall be required to deposit
the rent as it becomes due, in custodia legis pending the litigation." 495 S.W.2d
at 77. This is to insure that the money will be available for repairs and to encourage the landlord to mitigate damages by making early repairs. The court
may authorize a partial pretrial payment to the landlord for good cause.
King thus seems to require payment into the court, in contrast to the cases
it cites which say the trial court "may" require payment in custodia legis as the
rent becomes due. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083,
n.67 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal.
App. 8d 62, 71, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 699 (1972). See also Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion). Requiring the payment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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The defendant in King also argued that no rent was properly due
because the lease was an illegal contract inasmuch as it was based on
knowing violations of the housing code.46 The court agreed that the lease
was unenforceable in this respect, but that the landlord could still recover
the reasonable rental value of the premises in their actual condition during
occupancy.47 Otherwise, landlords would be deprived of a resource for
restoration and might abandon instead of repair their substandard housing.4 8
The King decision, giving the slum tenant a new contract remedy,49 is

may cause problems when a court refuses to accept rent payments, as did the
Magistrate Court of Boone County, Missouri, in a case in which the tenant relied
on King. Sowers v. A., A. & M. Partnership, Case number 73-951 (Mo. Div. II,
1978) (decision pending).
Another approach was used in Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526
(1970), where the tenant repaired the defect herself and deducted the cost from
her rent payment. The court held that this self-help defense was valid against
the landlord's rent action. Annot. 40 A.L.R.3d 1369 (1971). Contra, Ferro v.
Ferrante, 103 R.I. 680, 240 A.2d 722 (1968).
46. This defense is not available when the violations occur after the lease
is signed.
47. The usual view is that the recovery is not based on the illegal contract,
but on a tenancy at will that is created by operation of law when the tenant takes
possession under an illegal lease. Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d
492, 495 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
A tenant is apparently not limited to a counterclaim but may also initiate a
suit for damages and recover rent already paid to the landlord in excess of actual
rental value of the uninhabitable premises. In Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d
62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972), the tenant was entitled to an injunction to prevent the landlord from filing an eviction action, and a declaratory judgment that
she was obligated to pay rent only after the landlord had made the premises
habitable.
But in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court refused the
tenant's request for a declaratory judgment that Oregons eviction statute (OBE.
REV. STAT. ch. 105) was unconstitutional because it did not allow them to present a defense of landlords failure to maintain the premises, or to suspend rent
payments until claims against the landlord were litigated. Justice White, expressing the opinion of five members of the Court, said that covenants in Oregon
leases were independent and that it was up to the state to determine landlordtenant relationships. For this reason the Court held that the statute did not violate
due process or equal protection in limiting tenant's defenses. The King court,
however, said it preferred to base its decision allowing the landlord reasonable
rental value despite the illegal contract "openly on hard reality," i.e., that otherwise landlords would be deprived of a source of funds with which to improve
their properties. 495 S.W.2d at 79.
The court also required that, on remand, defendant elect before judgment
between her two inconsistent affirmative defenses because one alleged illegality
of the contract and the other sought to enforce a breach of that contract. Id.
at 79.
48. 495 S.W.2d at 79.
49. See Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REv.
24 (1970); Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Implied Warranty of HabitabilityDemise of the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20 DEPAUL L. REv. 955
(1971); Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Housing Leases, 21 DRA E
L. REv. 800 (1972); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability:An Incipient
Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FoRDaHm L. REv. 128 (1971);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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consistent with recent decisions in other jurisdictions and with the modem
reality of the landlord-tenant relationship. By finding an implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases, the court has responded effectively to a
substantial social problem.
JAMEs GROSS

MALICIOUS PROSECUTIONREBUTTING PRESUMPTION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR PREVIOUS PROSECUTION
Moad v. Pioneer Finance Co.'
Missouri decisions have consistently stated that actions for malicious
prosecution are not favorites of the law,2 and Moad v. Pioneer Finance Co.
reaffirms this. The plaintiff, a former office manager of the defendant loan
company, was charged with making a false financial statement regarding
property owned by prospective borrowers in order that they be able to
procure a loan from defendant. After the plaintiff left defendant's employ,
the defendant hired an attorney to investigate its delinquent accounts. On
completion of the investigation, the attorney, believing that the facts concerning the loan should be investigated criminally, furnished the Prosecuting
Attorney of Webster County, Missouri, with the records and statements
taken during his investigation. The attorney did not request the prosecutor
to file charges nor was he directed to do so. A complaint charging the
plantiff was signed by the prosecuting attorney and supported by his personal affidavit that its facts were true and correct according to his best
information and belief.
The complaint was dismissed by the magistrate court, because it failed
to state facts sufficient to constitute an offense. Subsequently, the plaintiff
sued the defendant for malicious prosecution, alleging that the defendant
maliciously and without probable cause instituted the previous prosecution
against him. At the close of plaintiffs case, the trial court directed verdict
for defendant. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. 3
Malicious prosecution is an action in tort to recover for injury done
to the plaintiffs person, property, or reputation as a result of a previous
proceeding initiated against him by the defendant-allegedly in a misuse
of the legal process.4 The elements of the action are:

Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEO. L.J.

519 (1966); Comment, Plotting the Long-Overdue Death of Caveat Emptor in
Leased Housing, 6 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 147 (1971); Comment, Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 16 VILL. L. REV. 710
(1971).

1. 496 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1973).
2. Bonzo v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 344 Mo. 127, 134, 125 S.W.2d
75, 79 (1939).

3. 496 S.W.2d at 799.
4. See W. PRossm, Tim LAw OF ToRTs § 119 (4th ed. 1971).
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(1) The commencement or prosecution of the proceeding against the
plaintiff; (2) its legal causation by the defendant; 5 (3) its termination in
favor of the plaintiff; 6 (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding;7 (5) the presence of malice therein;s and (6) damage resulting to the
plaintiff by reason thereof.9 The burden is on the plaintiff to strictly and
clearly prove all of the necessary elements of his cause of action. 10 In considering a motion for a directed verdict, however, the evidence is viewed
most favorably to the plaintiff," and he is given the benefit of every reasonable inference. 12
In Moad, the trial court's judgment for the defendant was based on the
plaintiffs failure to establish two of the elements of his cause of action:
legal causation by the defendant and absence of probable cause. The Missouri Supreme Court limited its discussion to the element of absence of
probable cause, holding (1) that no inference of want of probable cause
arose from the dismissal of the complaint in the magistrate court, and (2)
that an information based on the prosecuting attorney's personal affidavit
establishes a prima facie showing of probable cause.
In regard to Moaa's first holding, the Missouri malicious prosecution
cases differ somewhat on the inferences of want of probable cause that
may be drawn from the manner of termination of the previous criminal
charge against the plaintiff. The majority rule, followed for the most part in
Missouri, is that abandonment by, 13 or discontinuance at the instance of,
the prosecuting attorney,' 4 dismissal by the court, or acquittal of the

5. The defendant must have acted affirmatively and been instrumental in
instituting the prior proceeding against the plaintiff. See Bellington v. Clevenger,
228 S.W.2d 817 (K.C. Mo. App. 1950).
6. The prior proceeding cannot be pending when the suit for malicious
prosecution is filed; the plaintiff has no cause of action unless there has been an
acquittal or other final determination in his favor. See Euge v. Lemay Bank &
Trust Co., 886 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1965).
7. Want of probable cause is usually the determinative element in the
action. See Randol v. Kline's Inc., 822 Mo. 746, 18 S.W.2d 500 (1929); Standley
v. Western Auto Supply Co., 319 S.W.2d 924 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959). The
existence of probable cause is a complete defense, even if the defendant acted
with malice. See Dawes v. Starrett, 336 Mo. 897, 82 S.W.2d 48 (1935).
8. Malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause. See Hughes v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 261 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1953).
9. Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 1025,
74 S.W.2d 805, 812 (1934).
10. O'Donnell v. Chase Hotel, Inc., 388 S.W.2d 489, 494 (St. L. Mo. App.
1965). Whether the plaintiff has made a submissible case on the issue of the
absence of probable cause is a question of law for the court. Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 1026, 74 S.W.2d 805, 812 (1934).
If want of probable cause is affirmatively shown, however, the burden shifts to
the defendant to show that he acted without malice. Coleman v. Ziegler, 226
S.W.2d 888 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950).
11. Huffstutler v. Coates, 385 S.W.2d 70, 78 (Mo. 1960).
12. Knost v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 222 S.W.2d 593, 596 (St. L. Mo. App.
1949).
13. See RESTATEMENT OF TonTs § 665 (1938).
14. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1413, 1429 (1958).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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plaintiff'.5 is insufficient to make a prima facie or submissible case on the
absence of probable cause. 6 In Moad, the felony complaint was dismissed
for failure to charge a crime.17 Relying on Harper v. St. Joseph Lead Co.,' 8
in which the prosecuting attorney had nolle prosequied9 the charge against
the plaintiff, the court in Moad held that no inference of want of probable
cause arose from the dismissal, without a preliminary
examination on the
20
merits, of the complaint in the magistrate court.
To understand the second, and primary, holding in Moad, it is necessary to briefly outline the means by which an individual may be charged
with a criminal offense. The Missouri Constitution provides that "no person
shall be prosecuted criminally for felony or misdemeanor otherwise than by
indictment or information . . . "21 The procedure required in filing an
information is outlined in section 545.240, RSMo 1969.22 The prosecuting
attorney must file all informations. They must be verified either by his oath
or that of an individual competent to testify as a witness who has actual
knowledge of the circumstances or events.23 Verification by the prosecutor
may be based on his statement that the facts in the information are true
according to his best information and belief.
In Moad, the attorney hired by the defendant gave copies of the company's records to the prosecuting attorney, who then conducted his own
investigation of plaintiffs allegedly false financial statement. The complaint
against the plaintiff was supported by the prosecuting attorney's personal
affidavit; the defendant was not regarded as the prosecuting witness.
15. Knost v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 222 S.W.2d 503, 507 (St. L. Mo. App.
1949); Eckerle v. Higgins, 159 Mo. App. 177, 140 S.W. 616 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911).
But, an acquittal is evidence of want of probable cause and, if supplemented by
other facts and circumstances, can establish same.
16. A prima facie case is established where the plaintiff is discharged by an
examining magistrate at a preliminary hearing. See Eckerle v. Higgns, 159 Mo.
App. 177, 140 S.W. 616 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911). Arguably, this is oly true where
the maistrate has jurisdiction merely to discharge the accused or to bind him over
for trial. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1413, 1435 (1958).
17. 496 S.W.2d at 798.
18. 361 Mo. 129, 233 S.W.2d 835 (1950).
19. A formal entry by the prosecuting attorney that he will not further
prosecute the case, in whole or in part. BLACs LAW DicnioNAY 1198 (4th ed.
1951).
20. 496 S.W.2d at 799. See also Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty &
Inv. Co., 385 Mo. 1010, 74 S.W.2d 805 (1934).
21. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 17.
22. § 545.240, RSMo 1969, provides:
All informations shall be signed by the prosecuting attorney and be
verified by his oath or by the oath of some person competent to testify
as a witness in the case, or be supported by the affidavit of such person,
which shall be filed with the information; the verification by the prosecuting attorney may be upon information and belief.
23. State v. Statler, 888 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Mo. 1964). When the information signed by the prosecuting attorney is based on an affidavit of an individual,
"the person who made such affidavit shall be deemed the prosecuting witness."
§ 545.280, RSMo 1969. After a prosecuting witness has filed an affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney may disregard it and verify the information on his information and belief. See State v. Rotter, 193 Mo. App. 110, 181 S.W. 1158 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1916).
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Prior Missouri decisions have established that the return of an indictment by a grand jury is prima fade evidence of probable cause in an action
for malicious prosecution. 24 The term "prima facie evidence" has been used
to signify the equivalent of a presumption, 25 that becomes conclusive unless
rebutted by the plaintiff. Noting the rule applicable to grand jury indictments, the court in Pinson v. Campbell26 stated:
On parity of reason, the filing of an information by a prosecuting
attorney on his own information and belief is prima facie evidence
of probable cause, but not so when the information is predicated
on the affidavit of the complaining witness. 27
Nevertheless, Pinson was not mentioned in Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer
Realty & Investment Co.,28 apparently overruled in part by Moad. There
the plaintiff was not required to rebut a presumption of probable cause
even though the prosecuting attorney verified the information against her.
The court said that "this is not a case where an indictment was returned by
a grand jury .... " 29 whch would constitute prima facie evidence of probable
cause. Moad is the first case to directly rely on the Pinson dictum to establish that the prosecuting attorney's verification of the information creates a
prima facie showing of probable cause.30
The plaintiff's mere allegation of want of probable cause as an ultimate
fact is sufficient3 ' to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution where
the previous felony complaint was verified by a prosecuting witness only.
The return of an indictment 2 or an information filed with the prosecuting
attorney's own affidavit, however, requires pleading sufficient facts to rebut
the presumption of probable cause. The prevailing rule is that the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant procurred the indictment or information by
false or fraudulent testimony, the intentional concealment of material facts,
or other 33improper means, or that he did not believe the plaintiff to
be guilty.
Two other situations create a prima facie case of probable cause: where
an examining magistrate found probable cause to prosecute the plaintiff,
and where plaintiffs conviction in the original proceeding was reversed on

24. Harper v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 861 Mo. 129, 139, 238 S.W.2d 835,
839-40 (1950). See also Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 748 (1969).
25. Mannisto v. Rainen Furniture Co., 295 S.W.2d 841, 845 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1956).
26. 124 Mo. App. 260, 101 S.W. 621 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907).
27. Id. at 269, 101 S.W. at 624.
28. 335 Mo. 1010, 74 S.W.2d 805 (1984).
29. Id. at 1025, 74 S.W.2d at 812.
80. 496 S.W.2d at 798.
81. Ripley v. Bank of Skidmore, 835 Mo. 897, 902, 198 S.W.2d 861, 865
(1947).
32. See Wilkirson v. McGhee, 178 S.W. 471 (Mo. 1915).
33. Dawes v. Starrett, 836 Mo. 897, 922, 82 S.W.2d 43, 55 (1935). See
also Sharpe v. Johnston, 76 Mo. 660, 670 (1882); Firer v. Lowery, 59 Mo. App.
92 (St. L. Ct. App. 1894).
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appeal. 34 Here also the plaintiff must plead and adduce substantial evidence3 5 to avoid a directed verdict for the defendant8 6
Although one Missouri case said that the existence of prima facie
evidence of probable cause means "no more than to say the burden of proof
to show want of probable cause is upon the plaintiff,"37 it is apparent from
the cases that the plaintiffs burden is actually much greater. To prove want
of probable cause, the plaintiff need only show that the circumstances would
not warrant an ordinarily prudent person in the defendants position
believing that the plaintiff was guilty of the offense charged.38 To rebut a
"prima facie presumption" 9 of probable cause, however, the plaintiff must
show, not only that the defendant acted unreasonably by an objective
standard, but also that the defendant did not actually believe the plaintiff
was guilty. Alternatively, the plaintiff can prove that false testimony was
given or that material facts were concealed, but in addition must prove
40
that the defendant could have discovered this by reasonable diligence.
Whichever the plaintiff attempts to show, his burden is greater than simply
showing defendant acted unreasonably.41
The Missouri courts, in their aversion to malicious prosecution actions,
have restricted its maintenance through their definition of the plaintiffs
burden of proof. Moad, by allowing informations filed by the prosecuting
attorney with his own affidavit to be prima facie evidence of probable cause,
has greatly increased plaintiffs burden of proof in such cases, and seemingly
insulated from liability the defendant who has instigated a criminal prosecution of the plaintiff but has not verified the complaint as prosecuting witness.
W. D in= McCnm

34. O'Donnell v. Chase Hotel, Inc., 388 S.W.2d 489, 492 (St. L. Mo. App.
1965). The majority rule is that a conviction in the original proceeding is conclusive evidence of probable cause even though reversed on appeal. Although
this is only prima facie evidence in Missouri, a distinction between the majority
rule and the Missouri, or minority, rule is difficult to draw because the conviction
under the majority rule is conclusive only if there was no fraud or false testimony.
See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution§ 88 (1948).
85. Dawes v. Starrett, 886 Mo. 897, 923, 82 S.W.2d 48, 55 (1935). See
generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 264 (1950).
86. Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 1026,
74 S.W.2d 805, 812 (1934).
87. Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 188, 149, 3 S.W. 577, 580 (1887).
88. Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co., 835 Mo. 1010, 1026,
74 S.W.2d 805, 818 (1984).
89. Kvasnicka v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 850 Mo. 860, 878, 166 S.W.2d
508, 513 (1942).
40. Kvasnicka v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 350 Mo. 860, 867, 874, 166
S.W.2d 508, 506, 510 (1942). Dawes v. Starrett, 886 Mo. 897, 922, 82 S.W.2d
43, 55 (1935). See Willdrson v. McGhee, 265 Mo. 574, 178 S.W. 471 (1915);
Annot., 28 A.L.R.8d 748, 773 (1969).
41. See e.g., Davidson v. Montgomery, 232 S.W.2d 816 (St. L. Mo. App.
1950) (verdict should have been directed for the defendant since there was no
evidence that he falsely testified). Accord, Harper v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 361
Mo. 129, 233 S.W.2d 835 (1950).
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RULE 27.26 MOTIONS-WHEN IS AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING REQUIRED?
Colbert v. State'
Victor Colbert pleaded guilty to charges of robbery, burglary, and
stealing and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. He later moved
to vacate his guilty plea under Supreme Court Rules 27.25 and 27.26.2 The
trial court held an evidentiary hearing3 and denied the motion to vacate.
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court denied relief solely on the basis of
4
the record made by the trial court at the time the guilty plea was given.
The court held that where that record is sufficiently complete to show that
the plea was knowing and voluntary, an evidentiary hearing on the 27.26
motion is not required.5
The purpose of this note is to determine when a defendant is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on his motion under Supreme Court Rule 27.26
to vacate his previous guilty plea.
The validity of a guilty plea can be challenged for a limited number of
reasons. The Supreme Court recognized in Brady v. United States" that a
guilty plea breaks the chain of events that preceded it in the criminal
process. A valid guilty plea therefore waives certain constitutional claims
concerning the treatment of the defendant prior to his plea7 and limits
post-conviction relief (including a 27.26 motion) to an attack on the
voluntary and intelligent character of the plea or events arising thereafter.
Both Missouri Supreme Court Rule 25.04 and Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure require that the trial judge determine, before
accepting a guilty plea, that it is made "voluntarily with understanding of

1. Two cases: 486 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1972); 496 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. En Banc
1978).

2. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.25 authorizes a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
before sentence, and after sentence only where necessary to correct "manifest
injustice". Mo. SUP. CT. R. 27.26 deals with post-conviction relief.
8. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26(e) states:
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, a prompt hearing thereon
shall be held.... This hearing shall be an evidentiary hearing if issues
of fact are raised in the motion, and if the allegations thereof directly
contradict the verity of the records of the court, that issue shall be
determined in the evidentiary hearing....
4. 486 S.W.2d at 221.
5. Id.
6. 897 U.S. 742 (1970).
7. Tolett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1978) (waiver of the rizht to a
constitutionally selected grand jury); McMann v. Richardson, 897 U.S. 759
(1970) (waiver of the right to contest the admissibility of evidence offered
against the defendant); McCarthy v. United States, 894 U.S. 459 (1969) (waiver
of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to a jury trial, and
the right of confrontation). For a complete discussion see Annot., 25 L. Ed. 2d
1025 (1971).
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the nature of the charge."8 The constitutional considerations applicable to
guilty pleas were announced in Boykin v. Alabama,9 in which the Supreme
Court held that 14th amendment due process requires that the defendant
voluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea. 10 In dictum the
Court said that where the trial judge has complied with Rule 11, the
constitutional requirement is satisfied and there is "a record adequate for
any review that may be later sought.""
Prior to Colbert Missouri appellate courts considered both the trial
court's guilty plea record and the evidentiary hearing record to determine
voluntariness. 1 2 One commentator has recently predicted, based on Boykin,
that appellate courts will restrict their review in the future to the guilty
plea record.13 Further, Boykin allows trial courts to satisfy the constitutional
requirement and still avoid post-conviction evidentiary hearings by holding
that "the record of the plea proceeding is conclusive on the issue of whether
the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly."14
The unanswered question is "Under what circumstances does the guilty
plea record conclusively establish voluntariness?'
In deciding Colbert, the court said that "because of the record made
at the trial court ... [Colbert] presents the court with an opportunity to

8. In Flood v. State, 476 S.W.2d 529, 586 (Mo. 1972), the court discussed
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 25.04 and FED. R. Cm. P. 11. Rule 25.04 states:
A defendant may plead not guilty or guilty. The court may refuse to
accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge.
FEm. R. ClumV . P. 11 is almost identical. The court held that strict compliance with
Rule 25.04 is not mandatory. 476 S.W.2d at 583. Federal courts have held to the
contrary concerning Rule 11. See McCarthy v. United States, 894 U.S. 459
(1969).
In his concurring opinion in Flood, Judge Donnelly proposed a procedure for
conducting a guilty plea proceeding which closely parallels a federal court procedure recommended in United States v. Cody, 488 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1971).
The procedure is essentially a detailed sequence of questions the judge should
ask the defendant, and is set forth at 476 S.W.2d 585, 536. Judge Donnelly
thought that Boykin v. Alabama, 895 U.S. 288 (1969), and State v. Turley, 448
F.2d 1818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971), "invite[s] the trial
judge[s] of Missouri to utilize [this] procedure which could insulate most guilty
pleas from successful subsequent attack in Rule 27.25 and 27.26 proceedings, and
in federal habeas corpus proceedings." 476 S.W.2d at 587.
9. 895 U.S. 288 (1969).
10. Id. at 242.
11. Id. at 244.
12. Robinson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. 1972); Flood v. State, 476
S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1972); Brown v. State, 473 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1971); State v.
Grimm, 461 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. 1971).
18. Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri - Five Years Under
Amended Rule 27.26, 88 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1978). See also Finch, Post-Conviction
Proceedings Under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26, 50 F.R.D. 427, 487
(1970); Osterland, New Criminal Procedure in Missouri, 83 Mo. L. REv. 802
(1968); Pelofsky & Purden, Rule 27.26: A Study in Post-Conviction Remedies,
89 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 1 (1970).
14. Anderson, supra note 13, at 11.
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eliminate from post-conviction judicial process in Missouri much unnecessary and time-consuming activity"' 5 (i.e., evidentiary hearings). The court,
ignoring the results of the evidentiary hearing, announced that Rule
27.26(e) did not require a hearing because the guilty plea record disclosed
that the plea was voluntary.' 6 Thus, a record that complies with 25.04 can
conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief.' 7 Further, such a
showing of voluntariness and understanding may, because it is constitutionally sufficient under Boykin, "insulate the convictions from subsequent
attack in federal habeas corpus proceedings."' 8 Relying on Colbert, Missouri
trial courts have increasingly denied post-conviction hearings based on
19
"complete" guilty plea records.
A few months after Colbert the Supreme Court decided Fontaine v.
United States.20 Fontaine pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery in federal
district court. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the judge questioned the defendant to determine the voluntariness of
his guilty plea. He then accepted the plea and sentenced Fontaine to 20
years in prison. Two years later, Fontaine filed a petition seeking a writ of
habeas corpus to vacate his sentence on grounds that his guilty plea had
been induced by fear, illness, and coercion.21 Because the requirements of
Rule 11 had been met,
the district court held that collateral attack was
22
"per se" unavailable.

15. 486 S.W.2d at 220. For a further explanation of the record made at
trial see Anderson, supra note 13, at 12-13 nn. 65-66.
16. 486 S.W.2d at 221. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26(e) requires an evidentiary
hearing "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief...."
17. The court does not say that this will be true in all cases.
18. 486 S.W.2d at 221. FED. R. Cnm. P. 11 is virtually identical to Mo. Sup.
CT. R. 25.04 (see note 8 supra); compliance with Rule 25.04 at trial should therefore insulate the plea from subsequent attack in federal court. State v. Turley,
448 F.2d 1818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971). But see notes 2028 and accompanying text infra.
19. Henderson v. State, 487 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1972). See also Loflin v.
State, 492 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. En Banc 1978); Simpson v. State, 487 S.W.2d 512
(Mo. 1972); Pauley v. State, 487 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1972); Betts v. State, 493
S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); Moore v. State, 488 S.W.2d 266 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1972).
It is apparent from Betts and Loflin that the trial court is not obligated to
supply an indigent movant with counsel under Rule 26.26(h) in order to prepare
a proper motion. Rule 27.26(h) authorizes the appointment of counsel ff the
already-prepared motion presents issues of fact and questions of law. For an
interesting discussion see Judge Seiler's dissent in Loflin.
20. 411 U.S. 213 (1978).
21. Id. at 214. A motion for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970) closely resembles a motion under Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26. § 2255 states:
Unless the motion and the files and the records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall...
grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings
of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.
22. 411 U.S. at 214. This reasoning is very similar to that of Colbert.
The federal trial judge seems to be following a broad interpretation of Boykin
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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I On certiorari, the Supreme Court noted that the motion to vacate set
out "detailed factual allegations" of physical abuse, prolonged interrogation,
and serious illness and hospitalization resulting from heroin addiction and
a gunshot wound, all of which allegedly transpired between his arrest and
conviction.2 The Court also noted that a hearing on the petitioners allegations was required by statute unless "the motion and the files and records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief...

-24

The Court held: "On this record, we cannot conclude . . .that under no
circumstances could the petitioner establish facts warranting relief under
§ 2255... 25
The government contended that the defendant could not later repudiate
his representations of voluntariness made in open court when the guilty plea
was accepted,26 i.e., that the guilty plea record was conclusive. The Court
acknowledged that the purpose of Rule 11 (like Missouri Rule 25.04) was
to "flush out and resolve all such issues, but like any procedural mechanism,
its exercise is neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge calling for an opportunity to prove the allegations."27
Fontaine thus indicates that for purposes of habeas corpus petitions in
federal court compliance with Rule 11 does not necessarily assure due
process to the petitioner. Relying exclusively for a finding of voluntariness
on the trial record may not be permissible where, as in Fontaine,the petition
contains allegations which the guilty plea 2record
cannot conclusively refute,
8
or which amount to unusual circumstances.
(see text accompanying notes 9-11 supra) and Larson v. Coiner, 351 F. Supp.

129 (N.D.W. Va. 1972). In Larson the court, recognizing a procedure outlined
in prior decisions, stated that, absent unusual circumstances, if certain questions
were asked concerning the voluntariness of the plea, then the state court record
would be dlispositive of post-conviction allegations of coercion.
Many federal courts throughout the country, however, have been unwilling

to adopt the Larson rule and make compliance with Rule 11 conclusive as to the
voluntariness of the plea. E.g., in Jones v. United States, 884 F.2d 916 (9th Cir.

1967), the defendant's guilty plea was allegedly induced by coercive in-custody
interrogation without a lawyer. The court held that compliance with Rule 11
should not bar a subsequent petition containing allegations of factual matters

outside the record which the record could not conclusively resolve. See also
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (false promises of leniency); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (confession obtained by truth serum); Beavers

v. Anderson, 474 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1973) (threat of maximum sentence);

Schoultz v. Hocker, 469 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1972) (false promises of leniency);

Callegos v. United States, 466 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1972) (false promises of leniency); Hillard v. Beto, 465 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972) (false promises of leniency);

Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, (4th Cir. 1972) (false promises of leniency);

Reed v. United States, 441 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1971) (false promises of leniency);
United States v. Rawlins, 440 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1971) (unintelligent guilty

plea).

23. Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214 (1978).
24. Id. at 214. See note 21 supra.

25. Id. at 215. The Court relied heavily on Machibroda v. United States, 368

U.S. 487 (1962), which stresses the seriousness of the guilty plea and conse-

quently the need that the plea be entered voluntarily.

26. Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214 (1978).
27. Id. at 215.

28. See note 22 supra.
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After Fontaine,Colbert sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court seeking to vacate his guilty plea. The district court construed Fontaine
as establishing constitutionalstandards with which Colbert was inconsistent,
and held in abeyance the habeas corpus proceeding to allow the Missouri
Supreme Court to reconsider Colbert.2 9 Otherwise, the district court would
have to hold an evidentiary hearing because specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law were not made on Colbert's post-conviction motion.30
Upon rehearing s ' (hereinafter ColbertII), the Missouri Supreme Court
found that Fontainewas inapplicable because, unlike Colbert II, it involved
an allegedly coerced plea.82 Thus, the court reaffirmed its view that Colbert
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.33 As if unwilling to rely on this
reading of Fontaine, however, the court examined the guilty plea record
and the evidence from the evidentiary hearing that was in fact held by the
trial court and determined that it showed that in any event Colbert was not
entitled to relief.3 4 The federal district court which had held its proceedings
in abeyance thereafter denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
concluding that ColbertII was consistent with Fontaine.85
An outstanding weakness of Colbert II is that it purports to affirm
Colbert while using as the basis for its decision evidence (from the

29. Memorandum and order entered. Colbert v. Swenson, No. 20741-1
(W.D. Mo., July 27, 1973).
80. Id. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), which says that a
federal judge is not absolutely bound by the state courts decision whether the
movant is entitled to relief, but may use his own discretion and hold an evidentiary
hearing. The federal court may also, if it disagrees with the state court, remand
to the state court upon receiving a petition for habeas corpus. Carton v. Swenson,
266 F. Supp. 726 (W.D. Mo. 1967); State v. Garton, 396 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1965).
31. Colbert v. State, 496 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
82. Id. at 13, 15. Colbert maintained that he was entitled to relief on five
grounds: (1) Inadequate legal representation; (2) incarceration for one year

without a trial (under $100,000 bail) during which time he was constantly being

persuaded and harassed to enter a guilty plea; (3) false promises of a lenient
sentence made by the prosecutor (note that this is the ground upon which federal
courts have granted relief, see note 22 supra); (4) denial of an opportunity to see
his probation report; and (5) failure of the trial court to grant an independent
mental examination by a psychiatrist of his own choosing.
In response to these allegations, the court in Colbert II made their own
findings of fact based on the guilty plea record and the evidentiary hearing record
and conclusions of law: (1) The defendant did not act or rely on the promises
or suggestions made by the prosecutor when he pleaded guilty, if such promises
were made at all; (2) the facts show defendant made no effort to have a speedy
trial and was himself responsible for much of the delay; (3) the facts do not
support the claim that the prosecutor or defendant's own attorney made false
promises as to the length of sentence; (4) defendant was not misled as to the
way the pre-sentence investigation report would be handled; and (5) the facts
do not support the claim that the court overlooked or failed to act on defendant's
request for an independent psychiatric examination.
83. Id.
34. See note 33 supra.
85. Colbert v. Swenson, No. 20741-1 (W.D. Mo., July 27, 1973). Colbert
has appealed the decision of the federal district court and the decision is now
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13

22

et al.: Recent Cases

1974]

RECENT CASES

evidentiary hearing) that would not be available if it (Colbert) were
followed. Instead of relying solely on the guilty plea record to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of voluntariness, Colbert II thoroughly examined
and compared the allegations in the petition and the evidentiary hearing
record.36 As the dissent notes, courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel have,
after Colbert II, no way of ascertaining whether the guilty plea record can
conclusively establish voluntariness by simply conforming to Rule 25.04, or
whether independent
supporting records and perhaps an evidentiary hearing
37
are required.
A more fundamental question is whether Fontainehas any constitutional
implications at all, and if so, how they apply to fact situations like Colbert.
As noted, the district court from which Colbert sought habeas corpus
believed Fontaine placed constitutional limits on review of petitions to
vacate guilty pleas, but that Colbert II, because it considered evidence outside the guilty plea record (the evidentiary hearing) met those requirements.38 The Missouri Supreme Court in Colbert II also believed that
Fontaine established constitutional requirements.3 9 Yet, it is permissible
to confine Fontaine to simply construing the federal statute40 as to when a
guilty plea record is conclusive, and not speaking of due process at all. So
viewed, Fontaine has no compulsory bearing on 27.26 motions in Missouri
courts, the only constitutional requirements
being those of Boykin, which
41
simply requires that the pleas be voluntary.
Regardless what Fontaine may require, the Colbert position of relying
conclusively on a 25.04 record should be abandoned.42 Judge Donnelly
spoke of eliminating "from post-conviction judicial process in Missouri much
unnecessary and time-consuming activity."43 But is Colbert a means to this
end? The Supreme Court in the trilogy of Sanders v. United States,44 Fay
v. Noia,45 and Townsend v. Sain46 referred to the need for evidentiary hearings in the state courts to consider alleged constitutional violations. If the
state courts do not hold such hearings, there may be no record adequate for
pending. The court of appeals will follow the "clearly erroneous" standard set
forth in Missouri.
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26(j):
Appellate review shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings, conclusions, and judgments of the trial court are clearly erroneous.
See United States v. Strother, 458 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1972); Martin v.
United States, 899 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1968). The Eighth Circuit will reverse
the trial court only upon finding an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Rawlins, 440 F.2d 1048, 1044 (8th Cir. 1971).
36. See note 82 supra.
87. 496 S.W.2d at 16.
88. See notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra.
89. Hence, the court is obliged to distinguish Fontaine.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1978), quoted note 21 supra.
41. See text accompanying note 9-11 supra.
42. Again, Colbertdoes not expressly apply to all fact situations, but its tenor
leaves little room for different procedures.
48. 486 S.W.2d at 220.
44. 878 U.S. 1 (1963).
45. 872 U.S. 891 (1963).
46. 872 U.S. 298 (1968).
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sought47

any review that may be later
in federal habeas corpus proceedings
in light of Fontaine. The federal courts would then be compelled to hold
evidentiary hearings or remand the case to the trial court to do so.
Missouri courts would be well-advised to follow the guidelines established for the federal courts in the Fourth Circuit. In Raines v. United
States48 the court suggested three possible methods of disposing of motions
for habeas corpus relief.49 The first, summary disposition, would be
appropriate if the petition is "frivolous or patently absurb on its face."50
The court could enter dismissal on its own motion without requiring a
responsive pleading from the government. Second, depending on the nature
of the allegations, the court might appropriately require that the record be
expanded to include letters, documents, affidavits, and other evidence not
previously a part of the guilty plea record. 51 Third, an evidentiary hearing
might be required in some cases, particularly where the petitioner has
alleged grounds for relief that cannot be conclusively refuted by reference to
the guilty plea record or an expanded record.5 2 The need for the hearing and
the petitioner's presence would be left to the discretion of the trial court.5s
Both Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 25.04 are intended to promote a complete record of the
factors relevant to the voluntariness of the guilty plea and, thereby, to

47. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
48. 423 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1970).
49. The court would apply these guidelines to all habeas corpus proceedings,
regardless of grounds upon which relief is sought or whether the defendant
pleaded guilty at trial.
50. Id. at 529.
51. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (visitor and mail
records); United States v. Carlino, 400 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1968) (correspondence
and other exhibits); Castro v. United States, 396 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1968)
(affidavit from movants trial counsel); Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782
2d Cir. 1967) (affidavit from movant's physician).
For a vigourous discussion opposing the admissibility of ad hoc affidavits
see Judge Sobeloff's dissent in Raines v. United States, 428 F.2d 526 (4th Cir.
1970).
52. See, e.g., Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972). The defendant
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his guilty plea was
induced by an unkept promise made by the government in the plea bargaining
session. The government denied the allegation and both parties submitted
affidavits from various witnesses supporting their respective positions. The issue
being one of credibility, the appellate court remanded the case and advised the
district court conduct a full evidentiary hearing. The court stated that ordinarily
the method of inquiry-affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, etc.-is left initially
to the discretion of the trial court. For discussion of the issue of credibility and its
bearing on the necessity for a full evidentiary hearing see Judge Winter's dissent
in Walters v. Harris, supra, at 994, 995.
53. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) held:
Where, as here, there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which
the prisoner participated, the trial court should require his production
for a hearing.
Id. at 223.
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reduce subsequent attacks., 4 But to say that compliance with Rule 25.04
forecloses the issue of voluntariness is a mistake. The Supreme Court in
Fontaine has concluded this much in an analogous situation involving the
federal statute. Colbert II should be viewed as a reconsideration of Colbert
and a withdrawal from the position that compliance with Rule 25.04 insures
voluntariness.
MM
GODAR

SECURED TRANSACTIONS-DECEIPTION OF COLLATERAL
IN SECURITY AGREEMENT UNDER UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SECTION 9-203 AND 9-110
In re Laminated Veneers Co.
A security agreement executed pursuant to a loan from Commercial
Trading Company to Laminated Veneers covered explicity certain items
(including a truck) in one schedule and covered other items generally in
an omnibus clause purporting to secure accounts receivable, inventory,
fixtures, machinery, equipment and tools.2 Subsequently Laminated Veneers
was adjudged bankrupt and its property sold.3 Both the trustee in bankruptcy and the secured creditor claimed the proceeds from the sale of two
automobiles not specifically listed in the security agreement. Relying on the
4
definition of "equipment" contained in Uniform Code section 9-109(2),
the secured creditor contended that the omnibus clause included the two
automobiles and that he was therefore entitled to the sale proceeds.
54. The record, or an expanded one, was sufficient in the following cases:
Winstead v. United States, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972); Harris v. United
States, 436 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1971); Ketchum v. United States, 827 F. Supp.
768 (D. Md. 1971); Weathers v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 1853 (D.S.C.
1970).1.
471 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.
1973).
2. The omnibus clause provided that:
In addition to all the above enumerated items, it is the intention that
this mortgage shall cover all chattels, machinery, equipment, tables,
chairs, work benches ... and all other items of equipment and fixtures
belonging to the mortgagor, whether herein enumerated or not, now at
the plant of Laminated Veneers Co., Inc.... and all chattels, machinery, fixtures, or equipment that may hereafter be brought in or installed
in said premises....
Id. at 1125 n.1.
3. CCH SEcunnD Tn sAc~noNs GUmE, NEw DEvELoPmENTs (1969-1978
Transfer Binder) 151,448, 66,899.
4. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are the UNEroBm ComMERCIAL CODE (1962). N.Y. UNIFonM CoM2nx-cI.L CODE § 9-109 (2) (McKinney
1964), identical to UNvoRm ComNcvr.m.L CODE § 9-109 (2) (1962), provides:
Goods are
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business
(including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit
organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are
not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer
goods....
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The referee in bankrupty found that the security agreement did not
cover the automobiles and awarded the proceeds to the trustee in bankruptcy. A federal district court affirmed the referee's findings, and in turn
was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 5
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code supercedes prior law
governing conditional sales, chattel mortgages, trust receipts, factor's liens,
and assignments of accounts receivable and regulates all transactions in
which debts are secured by personal property.6 Article 9 is a response to
the need for greater uniformity in regulating secured transactions; it seeks
can be
to provide one set of rules under which commercial transactions
7 Implicit
certainty.
and
disclosure,
sufficient
simplicity,
with
conducted
in all provisions of Article 9 are two basic goals: (1) that a secured party's
interest should be safeguarded against a debtor's inability to pay, and
8
(2) that notice of a security interest should be provided to third parties.
A valid security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code, Section
9-203(a), requires that the collateral be either in the possession of the
secured party or that the debtor have signed a security agreement containing
a description of the collateral.9 The purpose of this requirement is evidentiary. A writing minimizes the the possibility of a future dispute over
the terms of the agreement or the identity of the collateral. Where the
collateral is in the possession of the secured party, however, there is less
evidentiary need for a written record and a writing is not required.' 0 Noncompliance with Section 9-203 (1)renders the security interest unenforceable
against both the debtor and third parties."
Section 9-302 imposes an additional requirement for the security
interest to be enforceable against various third parties: public notice if the
transaction involves nonpossessory security interests in certain types of8
personal property.12 Public notice is given by filing a financing statement

5. 471 F.2d at 1124.

6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment.
7. 0. SPIVAK, SECURED TRANsAcIONs (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE) 3 (8d ed. 1963). This basic purpose applies particularly to Article 9. See
UNIFORM COMMERCrA CODE § 9-101, Comment, which provides:
The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure
within which the immense variety of present-day secured financing
transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty.

8. 1 CCH SECURED TnANsACnONs GUIDE, SECURED TRANSACTIONS EXat 8022 (1969).

PLAINED 101,

9. Section 9-203 (a) provides that when the security interest covers crops,

oil, gas, minerals to be extracted, or timber to be cut, a description of the land
concerned is also required.
10. UNIFORM CoMjemnerCIL CODE § 9-203, Comment 3.
11. Id. § 9-203(1).

12. See Id. § 9-302 and Comments. These types of personal property include:
accounts, contract rights, general intangibles, inventory, equipment (other than
farm equipment having a purchase price not in excess of $2500), chattel paper
and documents of title. Section 9-302 thus requires public notice of the security

interest on the automobiles involved in this case. See also 0. SPIVAK, supra note 7,
at 84.
13. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302 and Comments.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. 14
Thus, the Uniform Commercial Code requires a description of the
collateral in both security agreements and financing statements. However,
the required descriptions need not be painstakingly detailed. 15 Section
9-110 provides that "any description of personal property or real estate is
sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is
described."' This facilitates the description of items that are difficult to

describe in detail and allows a blanket or general description for multiple

items like inventory.' 7 Section 9-110 has been construed as a rejection of

certain pre-Code chattel mortgage cases' 8 which had required exact and
detailed descriptions of collateral, 9 even where there was undeniable proof

of what was intended to be covered. 20 The Code has allowed
courts to
2
ignore these early cases and apply its less stringent standard. '

Most courts have held that greater particularity is required in the
security agreement than in the financing statement 2 2 based on their different functions: the security agreement is intended to minimize disputes
concerning the terms of the agreement and the extent of the collateral; 2
14. Id. § 9-402(1). There is some question as to whether the same degree
of specificity is required in the financing statement as in the security agreement.
See text accompanying notes 22-24 infra.
15. 69 Am. Jun. 2D Secured Transactions§ 292 (1973).
16. The Official Comment to § 9-110 states that the description is valid if it
makes possible the identification of the thing described.
17. 69 Am. JuR. 2D Secured Transactions § 292 (1973). See also Security
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hass, 246 Ark. 1113, 1117, 441 S.W.2d 91, 94 (1969);
0. SpivAx, supra note 7, at 27-28.

18. Perhaps prompted by the exacting description requirements of real
property mortgages, these cases required the same in chattel mortgages. E.g.,
Master Loan Service, Inc. v. Maddox, 68 Ga. App. 429, 23 S.E.2d 179 (1942).
19. See UNIFORM COMMERCLm CODE § 9-110 and Comment; 69 Am. Jun. 2D
Secured Transactions§ 292 (1978).
20. 1 G. GLMOR, SECuRTY INTERESTS

IN PERsONAL PROPERTY

§ 2.7, at

58 (1965).
21. Cf. James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Natl Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 194

N.W.2d 775 (1972); J. WurrE & R. SuMMERs,

UNIRMu

COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 28-8, at 789 (1972): "In our judgment, a minority of courts have been unduly
illiberal and have required more 'description' than 9-203 and 9-110 contemnlate."
Furthermore, White and Summers cite Laminated Veneers as an "unduly illiberal
case. Id. at 789.
22. See J.K. Gill Co. v. Fireside Realty, Inc., 499 P.2d 813 (Ore. 1972);
J. WmTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 28-3, at 788; 1 P. CoocAN, W. HoGAN,
D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANsACTIONs UNDER THE UNIFORM COM..MWERCI&L

§ 13.04[51,

4 R.

CODE

at 1860-61 (1978); 1 G. GLMORE, supra note 20, § 11.4, at 849 n.7;

ANDERSON, UNIFORM COImwxRCmAL CODE

§ 9-110:4, at 118 (2d ed. 1971);

H. BIRNBAUM, SECURED TRANsACTiONs UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
21.7, at 100 (1954). Contra, In re Thibodeau, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 878 (D. Me.
1969).
28. See In re Shelton, 472 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Thibodeau, 6
UCC REP. SERv. 878 (D. Me. 1969); James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'1 Bank,
292 Minn. 277, 194 N.W.2d 775 (1972); J.K. Gill Co. v. Fireside Realty, Inc.,
499 P.2d 818 (Ore. 1972); 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 20, § 11.4, at 847; J. WrITE
& R. SummER, supra note 21, § 28-8, at 787-88; 1 P. CooG,
W. HoGAN, D.
VAGTS, supra note 22, § 18.04[5], at 1861; 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 22, § 9110:4, at 118.
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the financing statement is24designed merely to put third parties on notice of
the secured party's claim.
The court in Laminated Veneers held that the term "equipment" was
an insufficient description of two automobiles for security agreement
purposes. 2r Although conceding that the two automobiles would be included
under the definition of "equipment" in 9-109(2),2 6 the majority decided
that the definitions of 9-109 are primarily for the purpose of determining
filing requirements.2 7 The court held that section 9-110 establishes the
28
standard for purposes of describing collateral in the security agreement,
and that the generic term "equipment" did not reasonably identify the two
automobiles.20

24. See James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 194
N.W.2d 775 (1972); J.K. Gill Co. v. Fireside Realty, Inc., 499 P.2d 813 (Ore.
1972); J. WmTE & B. Su n
s, supra note 21, § 23-3, at 787-88; 4 R. ANDERsoN, supra note 22, § 9-114:4, at 118.
25. 471 F.2d at 1125.
26. Section 9-109 classifies "goods" in four categories-consumer goods,
equipment, farm products, and inventory. These four categories are mutually exclusive. 1 G. G.oLMRE, supra note 20, § 12.3, at 371. As Comment 1 to § 9-109
points out, the classification is important in many situations, one of which is the
determination of the place of filing. See Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank,
324 F. Supp. 1029 (W.D. Okla. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972),
where the court indicated in dictum that it is not among the purposes of the
9-109 classifications to describe or create the security interest. According to
Mitchell, classification is not ordinarily a matter of intent of the parties (the
identity of collateral in security agreements presumably is), but a question of
law applied to the facts.
27. 471 F.2d at 1125. For example, whether a financing statement must be
filed under § 9-302 to perfect the security interest, and where the statement must
be filed under § 9-401.
28. Id.
29. 471 F.2d at 1125. See Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429
S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968); In re Weiner's Men's Apparel, 2 BNm. L. RiP. 63,727
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), as examples of cases in which broad general descriptions have
been held sufficient. In Mammoth Cave the collateral was described as "all farm
equipment" and "all property similar to that listed above." The court said that
these terms were so vague and indefinite that it was doubtful that they reasonably
identified a tractor. In Weiner the court stated that the term "premises" did not
encompass inventory and accounts receivable.
In re Lehner, 308 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 857
(10th Cir. 1970), in which the term "consumer goods" was held to be an
insufficient description of a tapedeck and a portable television in a financing
statement. However, the Colorado version of UCC § 9-110 applied in Lehner
differs from the official version of the UNIoRm CosnvmRcr. CODE. COLO. REv.
STAT. § 155-9-110 (1963) provides:
For the purpose of this article, any description of personal property
is sufficient if it specifically identifies and itemizes in the security agreement what is described as to consumer goods, and whether or not it is
specific if it reasonably identifies what is described as to all other personal property.
(Emphasis added).
The drafters of the Colorado Code apparently intended to require greater
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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The court also said that a creditor examining the security agreement
would conclude that the specifically-mentioned truck was the only vehicle
intended to be covered. 30 The court seemed to be saying that because the
secured creditor has specifically described some items of collateral, he must
specifically describe all items of collateral of a like kind-even though the
omnibus clause purported to cover "all equipment and fixtures belonging to
the mortgagor, whether herein enumeratedor not ....3 This reasoning is of
questionable validity: pre-Code cases usually held that the enumeration of
certain specific articles of collateral in a mortgage did not prevent other like
articles from passing under a general description,82 and post-Code cases
33
appear to have followed this rule.

particularity. Still, the decision in Lehner was criticized in 48

146 (1971).

DENv R

L. J.

The dissent in Laminated Veneers pointed out that many courts have
accepted the use of generic descriptions in financing statements. 471 F.2d at
1127. See In re Carmichael Enterprises, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
affd, 460 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1972) (accounts receivable); In re Trumble, 5
UCC RF'. SERv. 543 (W.D. Mich. 1968) (consumer goods); In re Bloomingdale
Milling Co., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 256 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (equipment); Goodall
Rubber Co. v. Mews Ready Mix Corp., 7 UCC REPI. SERv. 1858 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
1970) (equipment); but see Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank, 824 F. Supp.
1029 (W.D. Okla. 1971), affd, 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972); In re Bell, 6 UCC
REP. SEnv. 740 (D. Colo. 1969); Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York,
429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968).
The dissent also points out that several courts have allowed the use of
§ 9-109 descriptions in security agreements. 471 F.2d at 1127. See, e.g., National
Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1968),
where the court said that a description in a security agreement which described the
collateral as all good-will, fixtures, equipment, and merchandise was sufficient to
cover a cash register. In Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Blaze Oil Co., 463 P.2d
495 (Wyo. 1970), a listing in a security agreement of machinery, equipment, and
parts was held to adequately describe nuts, bolts, gas tanks, communications
radios, office furniture, typewriters, adding machines, and cash registers. In
United States v. First Natl Bank, 470 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1978), the court said
the description "all farm and other equipment" reasonably identified certain
irrigation devices; United States v. Antenna Systems, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1018
(D.N.H. 1966), upheld the description "all furniture, fixtures, and equipment."
See also In re Fibre Glass Boat Corp., 824 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd
mem., 448 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1971) (inventory); In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC REP.
SEv. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (inventory); Thomson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp.,
10 Ches. Sounty L. Rep. 405, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85 (C.P. 1962) (inventory).
30. 471 F.2d at 1125 (dictum).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. 69 Am. Jun. 2D Secured Transactions§ 298 (1978).
88. See National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 846 Mass. 255, 191
N.E.2d 471 (1968), in which a security agreement purported to cover all goodwill, fixtures, equipment, and merchandise and gave a rather exhaustive list of
examples of such equipment. Although there was no specific reference to a cash
register, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that a cash register was covered
by the agreement. In Security First Nat'l Bank v. Haden, 211 Cal. App. 2d 459,
27 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1962), a catchall clause covering all of the mortgagor's furniture, furnishings, fixtures, machinery, equipment, livestock, and persbnal property
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A more potent indictment of the holding in Laminated Veneers is
expressed in a strong dissent, pointing out that the majority failed to discuss
one of the basic questions in the case-whether it was the intent of the
parties, as expressed in the security agreement, that the secured creditor
could look to the two automobiles as collateral for its loan.8 4 The dissent

considered the breadth of the omnibus clause in the security agreement to
be indicative of an intent to include all the debtor's personal property, with
the exception of stock in trade.35 Such a broad security interest, attaching
even to all the debtor's property, is clearly permissible under the Uniform
Commercial Code.38
The best approach to the problem would begin by recognizing that the
Code's requirements concerning descriptions of collateral in security agreements should be interpreted in light of the Code's general purposes-to
enable commercial transactions to be conducted openly and with simplicity
and certainty. The draftsmen, in section 9-110, wanted to avoid the strict
requirements for descriptions of collateral that existed under pre-Code
laws. 7 Thus, if the agreement contains information that will enable one to
ascertain the collateral, it should be adequate, even if the collateral cannot
be identified from the agreement alone 88 The justification for this approach

of every kind located on specified real property, and which also contained a
clause listing specific equipment but providing that such listing should not limit
the general description in the catchall clause, was a sufficient description of a
nailing machine that was not specifically listed. In re JCM Cooperative, Inc., 8
UCC REP. SE v. 247 (W.D. Mich. 1970), the court expressly rejected the
contention that there is any inconsistency between general and specific provisions;
the specific provisions ordinarily qualify the meaning of the general provisions.
See also, United States v. First Natl Bank, 470 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1973).
84. 471 F.2d at 1126. The financing statement, not the security agreement,
gives notice to third parties. Thus, identifying collateral by inquiring into the
intent of the parties regarding the latter cannot adversely affect them.
85. Id.
86. James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 287, 194
N.W.2d 775, 782 (1972); see also In re JCM Cooperative, Inc., 8 UCC REP.
SEnv. 247, 249 (W.D. Mich. 1970); 69 Am. Jun. 2D Secured Transactions § 292
(1973); 0. SPrvA, supranote 7, at 27-28.

37. See UNTFoRm CommERcrAL CODE § 9-110; of. United States v. First
Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC REP. SERv.
160 (E.D. Pa. 1964); James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Natl Bank, 292 Minn. 277,
194 N.W.2d 775 (1972); Goodall Rubber Co. v. Mews Ready Mix Corp., 7 UCC
REP. SEnv. 1358 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1970); 69 Am. JuR. 2D Secured Transactions
§§ 292, 308 (1973); R. ADDERsoN, supra note 22, § 9-110:3; H. BmnaBAum, supra
note 22, § 11.7; 0. SPrvAx, supra note 7, at 26-27.
38. See In re Drane, 202 F Supp. 221 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Security Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Hlass, 246 Ark. 1113, 441 S.W.2d 91 (1969); 0. SPIvAK, supra
note 7, at 27.
Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 839, 852 n.6 (1965) states:
An additional argument favoring the acceptance of all-inclusive descriptions as sufficient under Uniform Commercial Code § 9-110 is the protection afforded under § 9-208, by which a debtor may demand that his
creditor approve or correct a list of the collateral under a security agreement. If the secured party claims a security interest in all of a particular
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is obvious. Detailed descriptions are virtually impossible in some transactions.3 9 Further, allowing descriptions to be phrased in terms of 9-109
classifications 40 would best achieve commercial certainty. In not accepting
such descriptions, Laminated Veneers departs significantly from not only
the intent of the Code draftsmen, but also from the trend of the better
reasoned decisions.
STEVEN C. PARRIsH

LABOR LAW-UNION LIABILITY FOR WILDCAT STRIKES
Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters1
On August 21, 1968, the members of defendant Local 249 honored
and supported a picket line established at plaintiffs Pittsburgh terminal,
and did not return to work until September 25, 1968. The strike was admittedly in violation of the "no-strike" provision of the supplements to the
National Master Freight Agreement, to which plaintiff and defendant were
parties. 2 Based on this breach, Eazor sought damages from the International
and the Local in federal district court under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act.3 Eazor alleged that the International had breached the labor contract

type of collateral owned by the debtor he may indicate that fact in his
reply and need not approve or correct an itemized list of such collateral;
but if less than all of a particular type of property was intended to be
included within a description and the creditor fails to comply, the creditor is liable for any loss caused to the debtor thereby. As the comment to
the section indicates, a third party, about to do business with a mortgagor, may utilize this section by demanding that the mortgagor produce
an accepted and/or corrected list defining what is covered by the particular description used in the security instrument, or simply clarifying that,
indeed "all" of the type of item specified is meant, thereby eliminating
the basis for a third party's subsequent objection to an all-inclusive
description.
89. 69 Am. Jtm. 2D Secured Transactions §§ 292, 293 (1973); 0. SPIAK,
supra note 7, at 28.
40. See note 26 supra.
1. 357 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
2. 357 F. Supp. at 161. The no-strike provision of the National Master
Freight Agreement provided:
The Union[s] and the Employers agree that there shall be no strike,
lockout, tie-up, or legal proceedings without first using all possible means
of [a] settlement, as provided for in this agreement [and in the National
Agreement, if applicable] of any controversy which might arise.
3. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1970) provides:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 13
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

by expressly authorizing the strike, or, alternatively, by not taking every
reasonable means to end the strike.
The district court concluded that the International had not authorized,
sanctioned, or given aid and comfort to the strikers, but found that the
International was nonetheless liable for damages under the alternative
allegation. 4 The court based its holding on the policy underlying federal
labor legislation, which encourages settlement through arbitration, thus
avoiding strikes. 5 The court reasoned that federal labor policy would be
furthered by requiring the union to take every reasonable means to end a
strike in violation of a no-strike clause.6 The court also recognized that a
chief advantage of collective bargaining agreements to employers is 7the
assurance of uninterrupted operations during the term of the contract; it
is therefore reasonable to imply from the agreement a union obligation to
take whatever reasonable measures are available to end activity engaged in
by its members in which the union itself could not engage.,
An employer faced with a strike that violates a no-strike provision in a
collective bargaining agreement, commonly designated a "wildcat" strike,9
has two remedies against the union under section 301: (1) The employer

activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by
the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued
as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the
courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not
be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme
Court held that § 301 "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law
for the enforcement of... collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 451. Section
301 gives federal district courts jurisdiction over employers's actions against
unions for violation of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement.
Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, UEW, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 911, rehearing denied, 855 U.S. 852 (1957). See also Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co. v. Local 1717, International Ass'n of Machinists, 299 F.2d 882
S3d Cir. 1962). Granting jurisdiction to the federal courts under § 301 does not
eprive state courts of jurisdiction in actions for breach of collective bargaining
agreements. (Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962)), but state
courts must apply the federal substantive law to promote uniformity. Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
4. 357 F. Supp. at 166-67.
5. Id. at 165.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 164, quoting from S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 16
(1947).

8. 357 F. Supp. at 164.

9. Spelfogel, Wildcat Strikes and Minority Concerted Activity-Discipline,
Damage Suits and Injunctions, 24 LAB. L.J. 592, 593 n.2 (1973):
ARoN.4Y
or INDusTrIAL
A "wildcat strike" is defined in ROBERT's Dic
RELATIONs 460 (1966) as a work stoppage generally- spontaneous in
character by a group of union employees without union authorization or
approval. It is frequently called by a group of employees because of
minor problems such as the disciplining of a union member, or may
exist where a local supports a strike but has not received approval of
the national or international union. A "wildcat strike" generally, according to Roberts, is in violation of (an) applicable agreement.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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may sue for damages from the union; 10 or (2) the employer may seek to
enjoin the strike."' These remedies are not available, however, unless the
employer shows that the union is responsible for the strike under a no-strike
provision in the labor agreement. 12 The federal courts differ in their view
of the union's responsibilities under the no-strike clause.
Two courts have held that the union is liable under section 301 only
if it actively supports the wildcat strike.'3 Thus, where the union did not
authorize the strike, and advised the strikers to return to work, the court,
finding the union not liable, said, "The question is not whether they [the
union agents] did everything they might have done [to end the strike], but
whether they adopted, encouraged or prolonged the continuance of the
strike."'" This narrow concept of union responsibility has been justified on
the ground that the union may not have the loyalty of all its members and
hence to
hold the unon responsible for an unauthorized strike would be
5
unfair.'
Unions have resisted increased responsibility for "wildcat" strikes by
arguing that it is an unfair labor practice to restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining.' 6 A wildcat strike, however, is not a concerted
activity protected under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.1r

10. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). The court held
that § 301 expressly authorized the awarding of money damages against a union.
11. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Local 770, Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
12. 24 LAB.L.J. 593 (1973). For a discussion of employees's liability under
a collective bargain agreement see Holtmann, Employees Liability Under Section
801 of Taft-Hartley Act, 88 Mo. L. BEv. 128 (1978).
18. United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955); Garmeada Coal Co. v. International Union,
UMW, 122 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1954), affd, 230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956).
14. United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877-78
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
15. Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat' Strikes Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672, 710 (1967).
16. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in § 158(a) (8) of this title.
National Labor Relations Act § 8 (b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A)
(1970), provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in § 157 of this title: Provided,That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.
17. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 246 (1962); International Union UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245,
257 (1949).
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The Fourth Circuit so held in NLRB v. Draper Corp.,18 and Congress
approved Draper in the Taft-Hartley Amendments. 19 The Supreme Court
subsequently accepted Draper20 and the N.L.R.B. has consistently followed
that decision. 21
Like Eazor, two other cases have rejected the reasoning behind this
narrow concept of union responsibility. 22 In Adley Express Co. v. Local
107, Highway Truck Drivers and Haulers23 the court said the "mere failure
to take substantial steps to get the membership back to work can constitute
sufficient union involvement in the illegal strike to sustain its liability."24

Similarly, Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers25 held that even

though the union's representative may have advised the employees to return
to work, he failed to take action which could reasonably have been expected
to effectuate that end and thus could be said to have acquiesced in and
26
condoned the illegal activity.
Eazor, Adley, and Vulcan evidence a trend toward broader union
responsibility for the acts of its members. 27 Broad union responsibility does
not place an undue burden on the union because it has the power to impose
sanctions against union members who fail to comply with the collective
bargaining agreement.28 The Supreme Court has held that unions have the
right to discipline, by fine or suspension of union benefits and privileges,

18. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944). See also Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278
F.2d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1960), where the court said:
[W]e... conclude the walkout (a wildcat strike) here was contrary to
the spirit and letter of the National Labor Relations Act and not one
entitled to protection as being "concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" under § 7 (29
U.S.C.A. § 157) of the Act.
19. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947). That wildcat
strikes were not considered a "protected activity" is clearly shown by Senator
Tafts (a sponsor of §§ 8 (b) (1) (A) & 801) express recognition that wildcat
strikers could be subjected to fines imposed by the union.
20. Cases cited note 17 supra.
21. See Stop &Shop, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 5 (1967).
22. Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446, 457 (5th
Cir, 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971); Adley Express Co. v. Local 107,
Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, 849 F. Supp. 436, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
23. 349 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
24. Id. at 444.
25. 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971).
26. Id.
27. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 801(e), 29
U.S.C. § 185(e) (1970), provides:
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether a person is
acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts per-

formed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be
controlling.

The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 2(18), 29 U.S.C. § 152(18)
(1970), contains a similar provision.
28. Spelfogel, Wildcat Strikes and Minority Concerted Activity-Discipline,

Damage Suits and Injunctions, 24 LAB. L.J. 592, 610-11 (1978).
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members who cross picket lines or violate union rules. 29 Although this
recognition of the union's right to use coercive methods involved a situation
in which the exercise of the power directly benefited the union, the right
to use similar measures against wildcat strikers to avoid a breach of a
no-strike provision in a collective bargaining agreement would seem to be
equally valid.
Eazor requires unions to take reasonable steps to end strikes in violation of a no-strike clause. The collective bargaining agreement the union
has signed should require no less. It seems probable that this requirement
will not place unions in an untenable position because the limitation of
"reasonableness" makes the union's duty correlative to its power and influence over its membership. Eazor provides a logical and just standard for
determining union liability in section 301 actions.
ROBERT

E. Cownnm

CONSUMER PROTECTION-MERCHANDISING PRACTICES ACTFRAUDULENT AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ENJOINED
State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc.'
I. Tim Missoumi STATUTE APPLIED

The cause of the consumer was advanced another step in Missouri in
April, 1973, by judicial recognition and approval of the new cause of action
provided in the Merchandising Practices Act.2 In the first decision of record
under the Act, State ex Tel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., the
Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the issuance
of an injunction against the defendant automobile dealer for certain deceptive and fraudulent practices.
The proceeding by the attorney general alleged violations of the
Merchandising Practices Act based on three separate transactions with
customers and a charge of general odometer tampering.3 In the first transaction David E. Cox visited defendant's place of business and was shown
a 1969 Dodge Monaco. The car was represented as new except for 3000
miles driven by defendant's general manager. Relying on these assurances,
Cox bought the car, but within a short time problems developed with the
car's radiator, air conditioner, speedometer, left door, transmisson, and suspension. Through investigation Cox learned that the automobile had
29. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 428 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 892 (1967).
1. 494 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
2. Ch. 407, RSMo 1969. Since the date of decision the Act has been revised
and supplemented in §§ 407.010-.130, RSMo 1974 Supp. Details of the new
legislation are discussed in part III of this casenote.
3. Altering or resetting the odometer of a motor vehicle with intent to
defraud has since been made an unlawful practice by statute, §§ 407.510-.555,
RSMo 974 Supp. Section 407.545 allows the purchaser of an illegally altered
vehicle to maintain a civil action against the violator, with possible recovery of
treble damages or $1500, whichever is greater, plus costs and reasonable attorney's
fees. Section 407.555 makes the violation of the statute a misdemeanor.
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previously been leased to Avis Rental Company and had been wrecked, and
that defendant's used car manager had 4purchased the car at an automobile
auction the day before its sale to him.
The second incident involved a 1970 Dodge Coronet, which defendant's
salesmen represented to Mrs. Mary Edith LaHue as a demonstrator, "just
as good as new." Accepting their assurances and being promised that the
car would be undercoated, Mrs. LaHue made the purchase. Subsequently,
Mrs. LaHue complained several times about the car, and certain minor
problems were corrected. Some major problems persisted: the car "wouldn't
track," shimmied at highway speeds, and the accelerator, air conditioner,
and fan did not work properly. At trial a former salesman for defendant
testified that before its sale to Mrs. LaHue, the car had been given to him
for use as a demonstrator, but it had performed so poorly it was unfit for
that purpose; and he demanded another. He also testified that defendant's
sales manager told him to have Mrs. LaHue bring the car in for an inspection because "the car had been wrecked and he didn't want anything to
happen to the deal." When reminded that no undercoating had been done
as promised, the sales manager responded, "Let it go," because "she would
probably never know the difference anyway." 5
Richard Phelps was interested in a low mileage car with some factory
warranty remaining and was aware of defendant's advertisement of Chrysler
Corporation's 50,000 mile or five-year warranty. Defendant's salesmen
showed him a Dodge Coronet with 31,000 miles indicated on the odometer.
Relying on their assurances that the reading was correct, Phelps bought the
automobile. About a month after the purchase the car failed to pass the
state vehicle inspection because of excessive steering play and a defective
idler arm. In addition, the car suffered from overheating, water leaks, and
defective windows, door locks, and brakes, and was generally unsafe to
drive. The former owner testified at trial that he drove the car from 1968
to 1970 and traded it with about 50,000 miles registered. The "inescapable
inference" was that the odometer had been turned back substantially between the trade-in and resale to Phelps.6
On these facts as found by the trial court, the appellate court held
that the injunction was appropriate, but agreed with the defendant that the
injunction imposed an overbroad prohibition. The decree was modified
accordingly, so7 that only specific practices defendant committed in the past
were enjoined.

4. 494 S.W.2d at 867-68.
5. Id. at 369.
6. Id. at 869-70.
7. Id. at 871. See Commission Row Club v. Lambert, 161 S.W.2d 732 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1942). Defendant also contended that because of the reference in
§ 407.100, RSMo 1969 (which specifies that three-days notice be given to the
offender in advance of filing an injunction suit), to the notice provisions in
§ 407.040, RSMo 1969 (which authorizes the Civil Investigative Demand), the
legislature intended to require the Demand procedure as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of suit. The court rejected that reasoning, finding no such
express requirement in § 407.100, RSMo 1969, or in the Federal Antitrust Process
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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The court of appeals first observed that in each of the preceding transactions the injured buyers could probably have recovered against the defendant in a common law action for fraud. In the Cox sale defendant's manager
knew the extent of damage done to the car; as a knowledgeable misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, his participation in the sale was
clearly fraudulent." The court reasoned that even if the salesmen were not
fully aware of the condition of the car, they still acted fraudulently by
making affirmative statements which were in fact false while conscious of
their lack of knowledge of the truth or falsity thereof.9 Similar omissions and
misrepresentations of material facts to Mrs. LaHue also constitute fraud,
whether due to deliberate misstatement or conspicuous lack of knowledge.' 0
And alterations of odometer readings and misrepresentations thereof have
been held fraudulent in Missouri.'1
Despite the availability to the injured parties of private legal remedies,
the court rejected defendant's contention that issuance of an injunction was
therefore improper. The purpose of the Merchandising Practices Act and
related legislation, the court said, was to create a public right of action
to supplement private actions which had proven largely ineffective because
of excessive financial burdens, unavoidable contractual limitations, and an
increasingly impersonal market place. To fill the void the legislature had
adopted this new remedy, with injunctive relief sought
by a public official,
2
as the chief weapon to protect consumers' interests.'
II. COMMON LAw AND FEDERAL mREmEs
Only after examining the few earlier modes of relief from which victimized consumers could choose can one appreciate the importance of the
new statutory rights of action now available in Missouri and other states.'
As the court suggests, the common law action of fraud has been the main-

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970), after which the procedure is patterned. The
Demand procedure is another pretrial discovery tool available to the attorney
general which he can exercise at will, but no consequences follow from its non-use.
494 S.W.2d at 366. See Annot., 10 A.L.R. Fm. 677 (1972).
8. Bowers v. S-H-S Motor Sales Corp., 481 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1972); accord, Miller v. Higgins, 452 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1970).
9. Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co., 401 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En
Bane 1966).
10. Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co., 401 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En
Bane 1966); Beshears v. S-H-S Motor Sales Corp., 433 S.W.2d 66 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1968); Wilson v. Murch, 354 S.W.2d 332 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
11. Williams v. Miller Pontiac Co., 409 S.W.2d 275 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966);
Jones v. West Side Buick Co., 231 Mo. App. 187, 93 S.W.2d 1083 (St. L. Ct,
App. 1936). Compare §§ 407.510-.555, RSMo 1974 Supp., discussed note 3 supra.
12. 494 S.W.2d at 370. See Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legis-

lation, 46 TiL. L. REv. 724 (1972), cited by the court, for a more thorough
history of the development of new consumer remedies; see also Halliburton, The
Uniform Consumer Sales PracticesAct-Some Consumer Progress,29 J. Mo. B. 235
(1973), for a discussion of some of the shortcomings of consumer remedies, both
public and private, in Missouri.
13. At least 42 states have adopted legislation similar in scope to the
Merchandising Practices Act. Generally, the various statutory plans can be separated into three categories. First, the so-called "little FTC acts" prohibit unfair
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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stay of aggrieved customers. Not all complainants have found satisfaction
quite so easily attainable as the three purchasers named in Independence
Dodge might have found it. 4 Considerable burdens accompany proof of
fraud; it is never presumed, but must be established from the evidence;' 5
and the burden rests on the one asserting it to do so.' 6 Missouri courts
have defined nine separate elements of the
offense,' each of which involves
8
a question of fact and must be proved.'

or deceptive acts or practices in commerce and empower state agencies to issue
cease-and-desist orders or seek injunctions against violative practices. Second, the
Deceptive Trade Practices Acts make illegal certain types of practices involving
misleading trade identifications or deceptive advertising which are likely to create
unfair methods of competition and harm the general business community as well
as consumers. Third are the consumer protection acts, to which Missouri's statute
is most closely related and which include the UNIFoRM CONSUMER SALEs PuAcTICES ACT, which are often phrased in very broad language and have the primary
goal of prohibiting practices that pose the greatest threat to consumer interests.
1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 3200 (1972); Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice
Legislation, 46 TuL. L. REv. 724 (1972); HANDBOOK or T=E NATONAL CoNFRaENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORMs STATE LAW S 349 (1972).
14. The three purchasers were not parties in Independence Dodge and the
attorney general did not request restitution for them. Each of the three did
recover his losses from the dealer later, two by settlement and one by a private
action subsequent to this decision. Interview, Harold Lowenstein, Assistant
Attorney General, in Jefferson City, Mo., Feb. 5, 1974.
15. Hardwicke v. Hamilton, 121 Mo. 465, 26 S.W. 842 (1894).
16. Lowther v. Hayes, 225 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1950).
17. Yerington v. Riss, 374 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1964); Powers v. Shore, 248
S.W.2d 1 (Mo. En Banc 1952); Williams v. Miller Pontiac Co., 409 S.W.2d 275
K.C. Mo. App. 1966). Those elements are: (1) a representation, (2) its falsity,
3) its materiality, (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of
its truth, (5) the speaker's intent that it should be acted on by the hearer and
in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity,
(7) his reliance on its truth, (8) his right to rely thereon, (9) and his consequent
and proximate injury.
18. Yerington v. Riss, 874 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1964); Cohen v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 444 S.W.2d 498 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Burns v. Vesto Co., 295
S.W.2d 576 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956); Hanson v. Acceptance Fin. Co., 270 S.W.2d
148 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954); 37 AM. Jun. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 12 (1968). In
finding for defendant in Yerington the court cited what it referred to as the
general rule in Missouri that fraud must relate to representations of present or
pre-existing facts, and cannot be predicated on representations of matters or
things to be done in the future. The court in Cohen denied the insurance company's defense of fraud to a claim under a policy where it appeared that the policy
holder had not read the application completely and therefore did not knowingly
give false answers. In Burns the court noted that whether there was intentional
fraud or honest mistake was a fact question for the jury. But the plaintiff in
Hanson was denied relief on his claim of fraudulent extraction of interest, the court
holding that complainant must exercise reasonable diligence to learn the true
facts when the means of discovery are readily available. But see Throckmorton
v. M.F.A. Cent. Cooperative, 462 S.W.2d 138 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970), in which
plaintiff recovered on his claim for fraudulent misrepresentation of the quality of
ground hog feed even though he had 27 years experience raising hogs and had
noticed the general physical condition of the feed. The court emphasized that
past successful dealings with the seller inspired trust and gave plaintiff the right
to rely on his statements.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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If an action for fraud was not maintainable an injured consumer was
often left without a remedy, and until recently had little hope for protection
against similar injuries or losses in the future. An early statutory development that provided the basis for protection of consumer interests in later
years was the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.19 In the twenty years
following its enactment the FTC was all but incapable of coming to the aid
of individual consumers who had been wronged because the Act required
proof of an actual injury to competition. The Wheeler-Lea amendment in
1938 enlarged the jurisdiction of the FTC to include "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce," as well as unfair methods of competition. 20
The immediate results were not overwhelming. Final orders were often
slow in coming and actual enforcement even more protracted. 21 The FTC
could not officially seek compensation for victims of deceptive practices,
and the statute did not provide for private causes of action.2 2 Recent years
have witnessed a gradual expansion of the agency's powers, with the FTC
fashioning broader orders to meet the needs of unusual circumstances,
occasionally without specific statutory authorization2- Thus far, courts have
given the FTC wide latitude in drawing its orders, striking down only those
found unnecessarily broad. These expanded powers have been called analo24
gous to those of a court of equity.

19. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970).
21. The classic case is In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 881 U.S. 924 (1965), in which thirty years passed between issuance
of the first FTC consent order, 24 FTC 1418 (1936), and final adjudication; the
company was assessed a $100,000 fine for contempt of court after continuing the
prohibited practice for years in its multi-million dollar business.
22. It has been posited that the mechanism already exists to create a private,
federal cause of action under statutes like the FTC Act. Lovett, Private Actions
for Deceptive Trade Practices, 28 AD. L. REv. 271 (1971). Lovett thinks it
possible to develop the private remedy through tort law, based on REsTAxvmNTr
(S.coNir) OF ToRTs §§ 285-88 (1965). Section 286 lists circumstances under
which a court may imply tort liability from legislation aimed at the injury-causing
activity. One such private action in tort has been accepted in cases involving
violation of federal securities law. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
The Supreme Court ruled there was no implied right of action under the FTC
Act before the Wheeler-Lea amendment in 1988, FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19
(1929); Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926), and has not
considered the question since. For a collection of lower court decisions, which are
split on the question see Lovett, supra, at 277-78. See also Gamin & Eisberg, The
Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 292 (1972), for a general discussion of the doctrine of implication in Missouri.
28. For example, the FTC has recently ordered refunds and exchanges for
victims of deceptive practices. Publisher Continental Sales Corp., 8 Trade Reg.
Rep. 19,856 (FTC 971). In Arthur Murray Studio, Inc. v. FTC, 458 F.2d 622
(5th Cir. 1972), the court upheld an order placing a monetary limitation on contracts between customers and the studio and requiring the studio to give customers
a seven-day cooling off period in which to cancel contracts. See Note, Consumer
Protection-Remedies of the Federal Trade Commission-Expansion to Include
Limitations on Contracts, 47 TuL. L. REv. 436 (1978), for a summary of the
development of the agency's powers.
24. Note, supra note 23.
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Other significant legislation passed in the same historical context as the
amended Federal Trade Commission Act are the Securities Act of 193325
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.26 Although not specifically designed to regulate consumer transactions in the ordinary sense, these Acts
did serve as precedents for the Truth-in-Lending Act.27 Truth-in-Lending,
although protecting in general the same interests as the FTC Act, differs in
at least one important respect: it provides for private civil actions in federal
court for violation of certain disclosure requirements. 28 Missouri has enacted
complementary legislation in its new Retail Credit Sales Act,29 but it does
not specifically authorize private actions.
Amendment of the federal class action rule30 in 1966 raised the possibility that groups of consumers injured by the same or very similar deceptive and unlawful trade practices would have a practical, effective mode of
redress en masse where individual damages were too small to pursue
separately. The Supreme Court apparently foreclosed that possibility in
Snyder 1.Harris,3 1 which held that small claimants cannot aggregate their
damages to satisfy the federal jurisdictional amount of $10,000 if the cause
of action alleged on behalf of the class is not "joint and common" to the
whole class, but "separate and distinct." The validity of Snyder was reaffirmed in 1973 when the Court held that all plaintiffs, unnamed as well as
named, must2 meet the jurisdictional amount in order to maintain a
8
class action.
It has been suggested 3 that consumers might still maintain a class
action in federal court by bringing a claim under a federal statute granting
federal jurisdiction without the requisite monetary amount. Success under
that theory has been limited, however, and it appears that courts are moving
even farther away from recognizing a "small claims" purpose in the class

25. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
27. Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 160165 (1970).
28. Section 1640 allows recovery of "twice the amount of the finance charge
[but in no case] less than $100 nor greater than $1000," plus costs of
litigation and reasonable attorney's fees. The action must be brought within one

year of the date of violation.
29. J§ 408.250-.370, RSMo 1974 Supp. The statute details the form and
contents of time contracts (§ 408.260); places limitations on the rates of time
charges (§ 408.300); and states the consequences of its violation (§ 408.370);
(1) violation is a misdemeanor; (2) violator is barred from recovery of time
charges and delinquency or collection charges; and (3) seller can correct noncompliance within 10 days after notice by buyer.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 28.

81. 894 U.S. 832 (1969).

82. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17,

1973).
33. Comment, Consumer Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23: Consumer
Protection Causes of Action Available Under Federal Statutes, 25 S.C.L. REv.
240 (1978).
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action procedure.3 4 If consumers are to be able to redress their grievances
as a class in federal courts with a reasonable expectation of success, it is
almost certain that legislative action will be required.3 5
II. CGummr Missouni STATUTORY

REEDIES

Act3 6

The Merchandising Practices
and similar legislation in other
states37 has provided a much needed remedy for consumers injured in the
market place.38 The statutes major departure from the common law is in

34. The leading case brought as a class action under the Truth-in-Lending
Act (see notes 27 and 28 supra) is Ratner v. Chemical Bank Trust Co., 54
F.R.D.-(S.D.N.Y. 1972), in which it was alleged that defendant failed to state
the "annual percentage rate" on its "Master-Charge Credit Card Plan." Up to
$13,000,000 was involved and up to 130,000 people were in the class. The court
held the case not maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule 23(b) (3),
because it failed the test of "superiority": the individual remedies, providing for
fines, costs, and attorney's fees eliminate the affirmative- need for a class action.
The court said allowing a class action in such a situation could produce "horrendous"
results.
at 416.
Another
caseId.with
implications perhaps even more damaging to consumers
is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973). The court upheld the applicability of the
class action procedure in this antitrust suit brought on behalf of 3,700,000 investors alleging conspiracy to fix commissions on securities transactions. Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacqueline, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). But in 1973 the court dismissed the action because the representatives refused to pay costs of actual
notice to 2,250,000 class members whose names and addresses were known. 479
F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
35. Three consumer class action bills have been introduced into the Senate
but none has been acted on. S.984, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.1378, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.1222, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, (1971). The bills were sponsored by Sen. Magnuson, Sen. Bayh, and the Nixon administration, respectively.
36. Although the Merchandising Practices Act includes all of Ch. 407, RSMo
1974 Supp., only §§ 407.010-.130 are the subject of this casenote. Other sections of interest provide for the treatment of unsolicited merchandise, § 407.200;
alteration of motor vehicle odometers, §§ 407.510-.555 (see note 3 supra); and
home solicitation sales, §§ 407.700-720. The last section provides for a three-day
"cooling-off' period during which a purchaser may cancel a credit sale of goods
or services made to him in his home.
Another recent enactment is the Cancellation of Automobile Insurance
Policies Act, §§ 379.110-.203, RSMo 1974 Supp. The act permits only two
grounds for cancellation of a policy, nonpayment of premiums and suspension of
the insured's driver's license, and forbids refusal of coverage to anyone with at
least two years driving experience solely because of age, residence, race, sex,
color, creed, national origin, ancestry, lawful occupation, or cancellation or refusal
by another insurer. Cancellation or refusal to insure must be accompanied by a
written explanation of the specific reasons for the decision.
37. See Lovett, supra note 13.
38. Although the UNwom COMMERCUAL CODE places an implied warranty
of merchantability and fitness on every sale of goods, §§ 400.2-314, .2-315, RSMo
1969, it is at best an imperfect remedy. By its own terms the warranty applies
to the sale of goods and appears not to extend to services or consumer leases. That
disability may not be absolute, however. Section 2-313, comment 2, states that the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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eliminating many of the strict requirements of an action for fraud.39 In
their place a rather broad definition 40 of unlawful practices is stated, leaving
the courts free to decide whether the state's policy of preserving "fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealings in public transactions" 41 has
been subverted in particular cases.
As originally enacted, the Office of the Attorney General enforced the
Act through its newly-created Consumer Protection Division.42 Private
warranty sections were not designed to "disturb those lines of case law growth
which have recognized that warranties need not be confined . . . to sales con-

tracts ... ." A few courts have applied the implied warranty of fitness to nonsale transactions. See, e.g., Citrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45
N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (leasing of chattels); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.,
102 N.J. 279, 246A.2d 11 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (beauty parlor treatments).
The implied warranty can be disclaimed by the seller if done in a conspicuous writing which mentions the word "merchantability," Umfnronm Comn2nncraL
CODE § 2-316 (§ 400.2-316, RSMo 1969). The disclaimer is effective if the
purchaser is adequately appraised of the disclaimer and it is effectively incorporated into the sale. But see Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452
(Ma.App. 1972), for an example of judicial reluctance to let the seller escape
so easily.
The consumer must also contend with UNIom ConvMcr.AL CODE § 2-719
(§ 400.2-719, RSMo 1969), which allows a limitation of remedies available to a
purchaser, such as limiting seller's obligation to repairing or replacing defective
parts or goods and limiting liability for consequential damages. But the section
deems a limitation on liability for consequential damages for personal injury from
consumer goods prima facie unconscionable, and if the seller does not prove otherwise the consumer may use all remedies available under the Code. Matthews v.
Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1972), applying Virginia law. When the
damage is only commercial, however, the purchaser must show that the exclusive
or limited remedy failed in its essential purpose (§ 2-719(2)), in order to have
access to other remedies under the Code. Courts are by no means consistent in
their interpretation of when a limited remedy "fails in its essential purpose."
Compare Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972),
with Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. App.
1972). See Comment, Providing Consumer Relief from Disclaimers, 22 DEPAuL
L. REv. 794 (1973), concluding that the consumer's present status under the
UNIFORM Co MERCIAL CoDE is highly uncertain.
39. See notes 17, 18 and accompanying text supra.
40. § 407.020, RSMo 1974 Supp., provides:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud,
false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely
upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the
sale or advertisement of any merchandise, is declared to be an unlawful
practice ....

The version under which the decision in Independence Dodge was rendered is
substantially the same.
Though the statute requires a misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact with the intent that others rely thereon, the injured party no longer has to
establish his right to rely on the statements made to him as in a common law
fraud action. Also, as in the Cox transaction in Independence Dodge, the speaker
need only be aware of his lack of knowledge of the truth or falsity of his statement. Ackmann v. Keeney-Toelle Real Estate Co., 401 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. En
Banc 1966).
41. 494 S.W.2d 862, (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978).
42. The division has been in operation since Oct. 13, 1967, the effective
date of the Act.
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actions under the statute were not specifically authorized until its revision
in 1973. 48 The division has essentially three ways to correct violations. First,
the offender may be notified informally that complaints have been made
and that he is in violation of the statute. In most instances a conscientious
businessman will mend his practices and no more official action will be
required.44 Second, if the offenses have been of such a nature that an official record is desired, the division may accept a written assurance of voluntary compliance, which will be filed in the appropriate circuit court.45
Third, where a pattern of unlawful acts or practices can be establishd
an injunction may be sought in circuit court prohibiting such practices in
the future.46 In investigating an alleged violation of the statute the division
may serve on any person believed to have relevant information, documentary
material, or physical evidence a civil investigative demand "requiring such
person to appear and testify, or to produce relevant documentary material

or physical evidence for examination.

. ...

47

The court is given a substantial amount of latitude in fashioning a
decree once it finds that the defendant engaged in unlawful acts or practices.
In addition to granting the injunction, it may make such other orders as
necessary to prevent the recurrence of the practices and to restore money
or property to anyone who suffered an ascertainable loss by reason of the
prohibited practice. 48
Perhaps the most significant change in the Act in the 1973 revision4 9
is the addition of a new section providing for a private cause of action.50

43. See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
44. Interview with Harvey Tettlebaum, Chief Counsel, Consumer Protection
Division, in Columbia, Mo., Jan. 18, 1974.
45. § 407.030, RSMo 1974 Supp: "[Sluch assurance of voluntary compliance shall not be considered an admission of violation for any purpose.'
46. § 407.100, RSMo 1974 Supp. Notice of impending suit must be given
the violator at least three days prior to institution of the action in accordance
with § 407.040, RSMo 1974 Supp.
47. § 407.040, RSMo 1974 Supp.
48. § 407.100, RSMo 1974 Supp. The 1978 revision of the Act gave the
court explicit power, when necessary, to appoint a receiver to take possession of
the assets, records, and other property of the violator. Section 407.105 sets out
the duties of the receiver, and entitles persons injured by unlawful acts to
participate with the general creditors in the distribution of assets to the extent
of out-of-pocket losses. It is presumed that this procedure will be used only in
unusual instances in which the offending merchant attempts to remove his assets
from the state.
49. H.R. 55, 77th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1973).
50. § 407.025.1, RSMo 1947 Supp., provides:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for
personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use
or employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared
unlawful by section 407.020, may bring a private civil action . . . to
recover actual damages....
The burden of proof is lessened by subsection (8), which provides:
Any permanent injunction, judgment or order of the court made
under section 407.100 shall be prima facie evidence in an action brought
under this section that the respondent used or employed a method, act
or practice declared unlawful by section 407.020.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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The consumer may recover actual damages, and the court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and provide such
equitable relief as is necessary. 51
Authorization of private remedies for consumers is a step long awaited
by critics of Missouri's consumer protection program.5

2

Still, costs of litiga-

tion and risks of defeat may be so great as to minimize the benefits of the
possible recovery.5 True, Missouri's scheme permits an award of punitive
damages and attorney's fees, but there is a common law tradition against
freely awarding punitive damages.64 Yet, there are fraud cases in Missouri
in which generous punitive damage awards have been upheld. 5
The second major feature of section 407.025 is the provision for a
class action for persons entitled to bring a private action.5 6 The rules governing this class action correspond generally with Missouri Supreme Court Rule
52.08 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, with one very important difference: Where the class action is maintained because of the predominance
of questions of law or fact common to members of the entire class, only
those members who are notified and request inclusion will be bound by the
judgment.5 7 In this respect, the plan is an "opt-in" instead of "opt-out"
procedure.
It is too early to predict how Missouri consumers will benefit from the
opportunity to maintain class actions. The plan's chief advantage would
seem to lie in the "small claims" area with repeated similar deceptive transactions. 8 One would expect that as claims grow larger, the uniqueness of
the separate claims would begin to overshadow the questions common to
the class.

51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Gamm, Regulation of Business Practices for Consumer Protec-

tion, 28 J. Mo. B. 438 (1972); Halliburton, supra note 12.
58. See W. PROSSER, LAw oF

TORTS

9-11 (3d ed. 1964).

55. The standard in Missouri for punitive damages in cases of fraud and
deceit is usually stated to be those instances in which legal malice is present. One
need show only that a wrongful act was intentionally done without just cause or
excuse; it is not necessary to show spite, ill will or wantonness. Beshears v. S-H-S
Motor Sales Corp., 483 S.W.2d 66 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Tatro, 416 S.W.2d 696 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967). On facts remarkably similar to those in Independence Dodge, the court in Bowers v. S-H-S Motor
Sales Corp., 481 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972), upheld a judgment of
$250 actual damages and $10,000 punitive damages.
56. § 407.025.2-.6, RSMo 1974 Supp.
57. § 407.025.4(2) (b), RSMo 1974 Supp. The plan would thus appear to
sidestep Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 8212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1978) discussed note 84 supra, requiring notice
to
all known class members, because no one is bound by the judgment unless they
"opt
in." See Fisch, Notice, Costs, and the Effect of Judgment in Missouri's New
Common-Question Class Action, 88 Mo. L. Rnv. 178 (1978).
58. Lovett, supra, note 22. In Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The
Mechanisms of Redress, 66 Nw. L. REv. 281 (1971), the position is advanced

that a class action works best when injunctive relief, rather than damages, is
sought. The authors see a loss of the requisite community of interest where the
amount of damages claimed varies among members of the class. If that proposition is accurate, might not the action be better left to the administrative body
empowered to seek injunctions for the benefit of the people of the state?
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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A secondary, but significant effect of the new private remedy will be
to reaffirm the position of the Consumer Protection Division as primarily an
advocate for consumer interests of the state as a whole instead of public
counsel on a case-by-case basis for individual consumers. The agency's main
concern will be to halt deceptive and fraudulent practices and prevent their
recurrence. Typically, it will not seek redress for particular persons who
have suffered loss because of those practices.
The procedure for an aggrieved consumer to follow is, first, file a
complaint with, or seek advice from, the Consumer Protection Division.
Second, wait for that agency to obtain an injunction or other order of a court
against the unlawful practice. Third, bring a private civil action to recover
damages.5 9 This gives the plaintiff the benefit of the injunction as prima
facie evidence of a violation of the statute. 60
With the Merchandising Practices Act Missouri has made marked
progress toward providing consumers with an effective weapon to wield in
the market place. Independence Dodge recognizes this legislative purpose
and gives it effect.
DENiS BARS

59. Interview, supra note 44. The procedure just outlined is not inflexible.
Should the situation call for it, the division will continue to ask for compensation
for victims of unlawful practices. There is, however, a definite legislative and
administrative intent to make consumer protection in Missouri primarily an area
of "self-help," with the state agencies performing those functions which are
impractical for individuals to attempt. Id.
Shown below is a summary of division activity for 1973.
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION
1973 ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT
JANUARY, 1973 through DECEMBER, 1973
JEFFERSONCITY ST. LOUIS KANSAS CITY INNER-CITY

TOTAL

COMPLAINTS:
Opened
Closed

596
464

1219
1571

923
477

234
71

2972
2583

NOTICE OF
INSTITUTION
OF SUIT:

6

7

4

3

20

15

15

9

2

41

VOLUNTARY
ASSURANCES
ISSUED:

4

11

5

0

20

INJUNCTIONS
ENTERED:

4

3

4

2

13

SUITS FILED:

2

5

5

3

15

CIVIL
INVESTIGATIVE
DEMANDS ISSUED:

60. § 407.025.8, RSMo 1974 Supp.
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UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE-VALIDITY OF
ANTI-STACKING PROVISIONS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
SET-OFF CLAUSE

Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Insurance Companies1
While driving his employer's truck, John Steinhaeufel was involved in
a collision caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist. 2 Steinhaeufel
sustained injuries in the amount of $15,000.3 His employer's insurance policy
with Reliance Insurance Companies contained uninsured motorist coverage
with a limit of $10,000.4 Steinhaeufel's personal automobile insurance with
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. also included uninsured
motorist coverage with a maximum limit of $10,000. Steinhaeufel sued both
insurers. By stipulation he settled with Reliance for the maximum amount
of its coverage, but State Farm denied that the remainder of Steinhaeufel's
damages was covered under its policy. 5 State Farm relied on the first paragraph of the policy's "other insurance" clause, known as the "excess-escape"
provision, which purported to limit coverage on the State Farm policy to
the excess of its limits of liability over the limits of other insurance available. 6

1. 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
2. The parties apparently agreed that the uninsured motorist was negligent.
Id. at 465.
3.The court determined the amount of Steinhaeufel's damages. Id.
4. Uninsured motorist insurance provides coverage when the insured's
injuries result from a collision with a negligently operated uninsured automobile.
An uninsured automobile includes an automobile to which no bodily injury policy
of at least the minimum limits specified in the financial responsibility law applies
at the time of the accident, or a hit-and-run automobile. The issue whether the
uninsured motorist was negligent and the amount of the insured's damages may
be determined by agreement of the insured and insurer, or if they fail to agree,
by arbitration. If the insured recovers on the policy, his insurer becomes entitled
to all payments made by the uninsured motorist in satisfaction of a judgment or
otherwise. See Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy, January 1, 1963
revision, CCH AuTo L. REP.-INs. 12271.
5. The maximum limit on plaintiffs policy with Reliance was $10,000, but
Steinhaeufel agreed to a deduction of $2016.62, the amount he had received in
workmen's compensation benefits. Reliance contended it was entitled to the
deduction pursuant to the policy's workmen's compensation set-off provision. If
Steinhaeufel had contested this deduction he could have recoverd the full
$10,000 because the court in Steinhaeufel declared the workmen's compensation
set-off clause void. See notes 32-42 and accompanying text infra.
6. The first paragraph of the policy's "other insurance" clause provided:
Other Insurance.
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile not owned by a named insured under this coverage, the insurance
hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar
insurance available to such occupant, and this insurance shall then apply
only in the amount by which the applicable limit of liability of this coverage exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of all other such
insurance.
495 S.W.2d at 466. The second paragraph, the "pro-rata" clause, was not directly
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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Since its policy had a limit of $10,000 per person and the other insurance
available (the Reliance policy) had the same limit, State Farm contended
that there was no excess coverage over the limits of other insurance avail7
able, and thus it was not liable under the plaintiffs policy.
The trial court entered judgment for the defendant State Farm. The
Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, reversed, finding that the
other insurance clause was void because it conflicted with the Missouri
uninsured motorist statute.8 By invalidating the "excess-escape" clause and
allowing "stacking," of the two policies, the court followed the majority
position,9 and reflected the increasing hostility courts are displaying towards

in issue in Steinhaeufel. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text infra.
Uninsured motorist coverage gives rise to several "stacking" or "pyramiding'
problems which will be discussed. Steinhaeufel involves non-owned car stacking
where the insured is injured while occupying a non-owned car and seeks to stack
the policy covering the non-owned car and the policy covering his own car.
Stacking also arises when the insured is injured by a negligent uninsured motorist while a pedestrian, or while driving his own car and has more than one policy
covering his several cars.
7. The excess-escape clause is applicable by its terms when an insured
incurs injury while occupying, either as driver or passenger, a car he does not
own. The excess-escape clause makes the insurance applicable to the non-owned
car the primary coverage; the insured's policy covering his own car is secondary
coverage. The secondary insurer is, according to the clause, liable only to the
extent the limits of the insured's policy exceed the limits of the other insurance
available to the insured. To illustrate: If in Steinhaeufel the State Farm policy
had provided for limits of $15,000/$30,000 and the Reliance policy had limits
of $10,000/$20,000, the State Farm policy would have provided excess coverage
of $5,000 per person and $10,000 per accident.
For a discussion of what "other insurance available" means in Missouri see
Haseltine, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Other Insurance Clause--'Available"
Interpreted, 38 Mo. L. REv. 840 (1973), discussing Gordon v. Maupin, 469
S.W.2d 848 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
8. The Missouri uninsured motorist statute, § 379.203, RSMo 1971 Supp.,
provides:
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered
or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided
therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits for bodily
injury or death set forth in Section 303.030, RSMo, for the protection
of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom ...
9. American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Romero, 428 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1970);
Tulley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.W. Va. 1972);
Eggleston v. Townsend, 336 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Md. 1912); Simpson v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Safeco Ins. Co.
v. Jones, 243 So. 2d 786 (Ala. 1970); Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy,
226 Ga. 710, 177 S.E. 2d 257 (1970); Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan.
788, 457 P.2d 34 (1969): Crenwelge v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 73 CCH Atrro.
L. REP.-INs. 7951 (La. App., March 12, 1978); Boetner v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 34 Mich. App. 510, 191 N.W.2d 741 (1971); Bose v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209. 181 N.W.2d 839 (1970); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Christensen, 494 P.2d 552 (Nev. 1972); Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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any limitation on the statutorily mandated uninsured motorist coverage. 10
Uninsured motorist insurance was available in most states at the
insured's option before it was required by statute.1 ' In construing the extent
of this coverage courts generally upheld the validity of the other insurance
clause and denied stacking, reasoning that since the other insurance clause
was clear and unambiguous and did not contravene any strong public
policy, the contract between the parties should be upheld.' 2 When the cover-3
age became mandatory, however, courts often took a different approach,'
by
holding the excess-escape clause violated announced public policy
4
reducing uninsured motorist coverage below statutory minimums.'
A few courts have continued to uphold the validity of excess-escape
clauses even after passage of uninsured motorist statutes.15 The most common
justification for this result is the notion that uninsured motorist statutes were
designed only to secure coverage for the motorist negligently injured by
an uninsured motorist up to an amount equal to the coverage the injured
motorist would have benefitted from if the tortfeasor had been covered
by insurance with maximum limits equalling that required by the state's
financial responsibility laws.'1 This concept, known as substituted coverage,

270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967); Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 25
Ohio St. 2d 38, 266 N.E.2d 566 (1971); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling,
429 Pa. 889, 241 A.2d 112 (1968); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 473
S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App. 1971); Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205
Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
10. See e.g., Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1972), noted in Hellmuth, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Validity
of Medical Set-Oft Clause, 38 Mo. L. REV. 346 (1973); in which the medical
set-off provision was held invalid. In Gordon v. Maupin, 469 S.W.2d 848 (St. L.

Mo. App. 1971), noted in Haseltine, supra note 7, decided prior to the enactment
of the uninsured motorist statute, the other insurance clause was interpreted so
as to expand the insured's protection.
11. See e.g., Burcham v. Farmers Ins, Exch., 255 Iowa, 69, 121 N.W.2d
500 (1963); Horr v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 379 Mich. 562, 153 N.W.2d
655 (1967); Globe Indem. Co. v. Baker's Estate, 22 App. Div. 2d 658, 253
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1964).
12. See Horr v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 379 Mich. 562, 153 N.W.2d
655 (1967).
13. Compare Horr v. Detroit Auto. Ins. Exch., 379 Mich. 562, 153 N.W.2d
655 (1967) with Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 32 Mich. App. 115,
7638 (1972).
188 N.W.2d 216 (1971), aff'd, 73 CCH Auro. L. REP.-INs.
Horr, involving two policies issued before enactment of the Michigan uninsured
motorist statute (Mic. ComP. LAws ANN. § 500.310 (1967) denied stacking.

Blakeslee, decided after the enactment of the statute, expressly distinguished Horr
and allowed stacking.
14. See Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 32 Mich. App. 115, 188
7633 (1972).
N.W.2d 216 (1972), aff'd, 73 CCH AuTo. L. REP.-INs.
15. Chandler v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.
1965); M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968);

Tindall v. Farmers Auto. Management Corp., 81 Ill. App. 2d 165, 226 N.E.2d

897 (1967); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 213 A.2d 420 (Md. 1965); Martin v.
Christensen, 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 (1969).
16. The courts that uphold the excess-escape clause reason that the uninsured
motorist statute requires only that a fund with the statutory minimum limits be
available to the insured once, and that a provision which does not reduce this
minimum fund is valid. The so-called substituted coverage doctrine has had a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13
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is reflected also in the expressions of some courts to the effect that allowing
stacking would give a windfall to a party injured by an uninsured motorist
as opposed to a motorist covered by insurance complying with the minimum
standards of the local safety responsibility law.17
Steinhaeufel rejected the substituted coverage rationale, holding that
the legislature had placed no maximum limit on coverage and could not
have intended that the coverage be only a substitute for minimum financial
responsibility."' The court pointed out that rigorous adherence to the substituted coverage theory could leave one who would otherwise be protected
by his own uninsured motorist clause without financial recourse in cases
where other injured parties had already appropriated the full limits of the
primary coverage.' 9 Steinhaeufel does not hold the excess-escape clause
checkered career in Missouri as elsewhere. The doctrine is theoretically sound
because the uninsured motorist statute is tied to the financial responsibility
statutes: the uninsured motorist coverage must be "not less than the limits for
bodily injury or death set forth in section 803.030 BSMo .... ." § 879.208, RSMo
1969. Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1972), enthusiastically embraced the substituted coverage theory at least
to the extent it provides a minimum level of recovery where medical set-offs of
uninsured motorist coverage are involved. Id. at 152. For a discussion of Webb
approvingly cited in Steinhaeufel see Hellmuth, supra note 10, at 347, 354 n.41.
Compare Gordon v. Maupin, 469 S.W.2d 848 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971), in which
the court rejected the substituted coverage doctrine. See note 19, infra.
17. The court in Steinhaeufel states:
Another theory argued in other jurisdictions has been that it was not
the intention of the legislature to provide a windfall to those who had
been injured in accidents caused by drivers of automobile covered by
the standard automobile insurance policy.
495 S.W.2d at 467. The court apparently omitted the word "not" before "covered";
otherwise the sentence makes no sense. Missouri's Financial Responsibility Law
requires a driver to have coverage with minimum limits of $10,0001$20,000.
§ 303.030 RSMo 1971 Supp. An injured party could recover more than the
statutory amounts if he has the fortuity to collide with an uninsured motorist
because several policies may then apply.
18. By not placing a maximum limit on the amount of uninsured motorist
coverage an insured can purchase, the legislature left open the possibility of an
insured being in a better position if hit by an uninsured motorist than by an
insured motorist, even where only one policy applies. Steinhaeufel used this
reasoning to substantiate its conclusion that the legislature did not intend the
statutory uninsured motorist coverage to provide only substitute coverage and
no more.
19. Gordon v. Maupin, 469 S.W.2d 848 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971), decided
prior to the enactment of the uninsured motorist statute, is an instance where
other injured parties had appropriated most of the funds of the uninsured motorist
coverage. The other insurance clause was under consideration with respect to the
meaning of "other insurance available." The plaintiff, one of four occupants,
sustained injuries in the amount of $5,000. The automobile plaintiff occupied
had uninsured motorist coverage with limits of $5,000/$10,000. The plaintiff
had a policy with the same insurer on her own car that included uninsured
motorist coverage with the same limits. The insurer paid $8397 to the driver
and the other two guest passengers on the first policy. The insurer claimed that
its liability to the plaintiff on the first policy was $1603 and that it was not
liable on her own policy. The plaintiff contended that other insurance was available to the extent of $1603, and that her own policy provided the excess coverage
of $3397 ($5000-$1603). The insurer relied on the substituted coverage doctrine.
If the negligent driver had been covered by a policy with limits of $5000/$10,000,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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unreasonable; the clause is unenforceable20because the uninsured motorist
statute precludes any limitation on liability.
In addition to the excess-escape clause, uninsured motorist insurance
includes other limitations and exclusions that are of questionable validity
after Steinhaeufel.21 The "pro-rata" provision of the other insurance clause

laintiff and the other three occupants would have competed for a fund of only
10,000. The insurer asserted that the substituted coverage rationale behind
uninsured motorist coverage dictated that the available fund be no larger than
$10,000 if the driver was uninsured. The court rejected the substituted coverage
rationale and held that "other insurance available" meant insurance "actually
available" and not "theoretically available."
20. There are several extensions of Steinhaeufel which may be litigated in
the future. Suppose the plaintiff owned two personal cars, each insured by a
separate policy containing uninsured motorist coverage. To the extent the excessescape provision is unenforceable both these policies could be pyramided atop
any primary coverage that might be available. Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970), involved this fact situation. The
court approved stacking, saying:
The premium paid with respect to each policy of insurance necessarily
includes an amount in payment of the uninsured motorist coverage;
it would be unconscionable to permit insurers to collect a premium for a
coverage which they are required by statute to provide, and then to
avoid payment of a loss because of language of limitation devised by
themselves.
Id. at 1156.
Suppose the plaintiff in Simpson owned two cars which were covered by the
same policy. The question might arise whether each car is covered by a separate
uninsured motorist endorsement, and if so, whether the coverage could be stacked
to increase the limits of liability. Because policies insuring two cars include a
separate premium for each car for uninsured motorist coverage, the insured is
arguably purchasing separate uninsured motorist coverage for each car, exactly
as if the cars were covered by separate policies, and stacking should be allowed.
See Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34 (1969).
Even though a separate premium is paid for each car under the same policy,
the premium for each additional car is less than the premium for the first car.
In American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 473 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971),
a.f'd, 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972), the defendant insurer convinced the court
that the premium differential for additional cars was due to the non-owned car
coverage. Defendant asserted that the premium for the first car is composed of
two elements: the premium covering the insured while driving the insured car,
and the premium for non-owned car and pedestrian exposure. The premium for
additional cars was assertedly to cover the insured only while driving that car;
hence, the premium for non-owned car coverage and pedestrian coverage was
paid only once. The insured was not allowed to stack the coverage.
21. The "pro-rata" clause, Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy,
January 1, 1963 revision provides:
[elxcept as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other
similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the
damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which
this coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the
sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
insurance.
CCH Aurro. L. REP.-INs. [ 2315.
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is applicable when two or more policies provide coverage of the same leve 2
to the insured. For example, suppose two policies cover the same claim, one
policy with a limit of $10,000 per person and the other policy with a $15,000
per person limit. If stacking were allowed the total potential coverage would
be $25,000 for one person. The pro-rata clause, however, would prohibit
stacking by limiting total recovery on all applicable policies to the limits of
recovery of the policy with the highest limits, in this instance, $15,000. Thus
this feature of the pro-rata clause acts precisely like the "excess escape"
clause and attempts to prohibit stacking. After Steinhaeufel this feature of
the pro-rata provision is probably ineffective for the same reason the
"excess escape" clause is ineffective-it attempts to limit the insurer's uninsured motorist coverage in a manner not provided for in the uninsured
23
motorist statute.
The second part of the pro-rata clause apportions liability among the
available policies according to their policy limits. 2 4 This feature of the clause
would probably withstand a Steinhaeufel attack insofar as it does not limit
the insured's total recovery but only apportions liability between the
25
insurers.
A third anti-stacking clause found in many uninsured motorist policies,
the "exclusionary" clause, 26 purports to preclude "owned car" stacking.2 7 This
clause excludes from coverage injuries the insured sustains while occupying
another automobile he owns. Although it is subject to a Steinhaeufel attack,
it may involve different policy considerations. Some courts have found that
the "exclusionary clause" does not conflict with uninsured motorist statutes,
22. "'Coverage of the same leveF' means that the policies are applicable to
the claim simultaneously, as distinguished from the situation where one policy
is primary coverage and another policy provides secondary coverage. One such
instance of simultaneous coverage is where a pedestrian, hit by a negligent uninsured motorist, is the owner of two cars, each insured by a separate policy containing uninsured motorist coverage. The policies simultaneously cover the insured
while he is a pedestrian and neither policy is subordinate to the other policy's
coverage. In this situation, the pro-rata clause apportions the liability between
the insurers.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. For example: Plaintiff suffers $10,000 damages, and has two policies
with limits of, say, $10,000 and $15,000. The first policy will provide 40 percent
of the coverage ($10,000/$25,000).
25. If the second part of the clause were invalid, the insured could recover
his damages from either insurer at his option. The clause limits the insured's
freedom in choosing from which insurer to recover.
26. The exclusionary clause (Standard Family Combination Automobile
Policy, January 1, 1963 revision, CCH AuTo. LAw RFP.-INs.

2306) provides:

Exclusions. This policy does not apply under [Uninsured motorist coverage]: (a) to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile
(other than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured or a
relative, or through being struck by such an automobile.
27. "Owned-car" stacking refers to the situation where an insured, while
occupying one of several cars which he owns, sustains injuries in a collision caused
by an uninsured motorist, and each of his cars is insured by a separate policy
containing uninsured motorist coverage. The owner of the cars is an insured under
each policy and theoretically would be able to recover on all policies. The "exclusionary" clause attempts to preclude this possibility. Standard Family Combination
Automobile Policy, January 1, 1963 revision, CCH AuTo. L. REP.-INs. 1 2306.
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based primarily on their fear that to hold otherwise would allow an insured
to purchase uninsured motorist protection on one owned vehicle and claim
uninsured motorist protection thereunder while driving any number of
unisured vehicles he owns.28 This consideration is inapplicable to the other
types of anti-stacking clauses previously discussed.2 9
Courts that allow owned-car stacking counter this argument by reasoning that the exclusionary clause contravenes the uninsured motorist statute
by attempting to limit liability where the statute did not provide for such
limitation.30 These courts have found a legislative intent to protect persons,
not vehicles.3 ' Thus, it is irrelevant which car the insured was occupying.
Steinhaeufel also deals with another attempt by insurers to limit liability
under uninsured motorist coverage, the workmen's compensation set-off
provision.3 2 The issue is raised because Steinhaeufel was injured in the
course of his employment with Griffith Brokerage Company, the owner of
the truck involved in the collision. Steinhaeufel received $2016.62 in workmen's compensation benefits.33 State Farm contended that if it were liable

28. Owens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Ariz. App. 181, 487 P.2d 402 (1971);
Holcomb v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 73 CCH Au-ro. L. BRP.-INs. 7886 (Ark., May
21, 1978); Dhane v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 73 CCII Auro. L. REP.-INs.
117925 (Tex. Civ. App., June 14, 1978).
29. The previous stacking hypotheticals involve situations in which the
insured has been injured while either occupying a car not owned by him or as
a pedestrian.
The uninsured motorist coverage is mandatory in Missouri unless the insured
rejects it in writing. § 879.208, fiSMo 1971 Supp. A court may be hesitant to
allow an insured to recover on the coverage applicable to one of his cars when he
was injured while driving a car on which he had deliberately rejected the uninsured motorist coverage.
30. Bass v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 73 CCH Atro. L. REP.-INs.
7751 (Ga. App., Jan. 81, 1978); Gulf American Fire & Cas. Co. v. McNeal,
115 Ga. App. 286, 154 S.E.2d 411 (1967); Deterding v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 78 Ill. App. 29, 22 N.E.2d 528 (1966); Crenwelge v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 73 CCII AuTo. L. REP.-INs. 7951 (La. App., March 12, 1978);
Boetner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 84 Mich. App. 510, 191 N.W.2d 741 (1971),
aff'd, 78 CCHI AuTo. L. REP.-INs. 7634 (1972); Lipscomb v. Security Ins. Co.,
213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972).
81. Lipscomb v. Security Ins. Co., 231 Va. 81, 88, 189 S.E.2d 820, 322
(1972).
82. The workmen's compensation set-off provision of the plaintiff's policy
was not set forth in Steinhaeufel. The Standard Family Combination Automobile
Policy provides:
Limits of Liability
b. Any amount payable under the terms of [Uninsured Motorist]
because of bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is
insured under this part [Uninsured Motorist] shall be reduced by
(2) The amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on
account of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law,
disability benefits law or any similar law.
Standard Family Combination Automobile Policy, January 1, 1963 revision, CCH
AuTo. L. REP.-INs. 2811. For a discussion suggesting that the exact wording of
a set-off clause may be crucial see Hellmuth, supra note 10.
83. 495 S.W.2d at 468.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/13

52

et al.: Recent Cases
1974]

RECENT CASES

under the uninsured motorist coverage, then pursuant to the workmen's
compensation set-off provision its liability should be reduced by the amount
paid to Steinhaeufel in compensation benefits.
The court rejected State Farm's contention for two reasons. The first
is peculiar to the facts in Steinhaeufel.Under the settlement agreement with
Reliance, Steinhaeufel received the $10,000 policy maximum reduced by
the amount he had received in workmen's compensation benefits. Granting
State Farm the set-off would have allowed a double set-off for the same
recovery.
The court also rejected State Farm's contention because it found the
set-off provision void because it conflicted with the Missouri uninsured
motorist statute.3 4 The court did not explain the reasoning behind this conclusion, but simply relied on Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3 5 In Webb the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District,
held the medical expense set-off provision void because it conflicted with the
uninsured motorist statute3 6 by attempting to reduce the uninsured motorist
coverage below the statutory minimum. 37 But, Webb adopted the substituted
coverage rationale as the most convincing basis for its decision.3 By wholeheartedly embracing Webb as precedent without discussing its substituted
coverage aspects, Steinhaeufel is self-contradictory; it rejects a theory in
one part of its opinion3 9 that is a major aspect of the rationale behind
another part of the opinion.40 A resolution to this contradiction is suggested
by noting that the substituted coverage doctrine was
alternatively accepted
41
or rejected to afford the insured the most coverage.
84. § 379.208, RSMo 1971 Supp.

35. 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
36. § 879.208, RSMo 1971 Supp.

87. 479 S.W.2d at 140.
88. The Webb court stated,

We also cited with approval the view, then as now generally held, that

the purpose of uninsured motorist statute "is to give the same protection

to the person injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have had if

he had been injured... by an automobile covered by a standard liability

policy."
Id. at 151, quoting from Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156

N.W.2d 188, 186 (1968).

39. 495 S.W.2d at 467.

40. Id. at 468.
41. Steinhaeufel is in accord with the majority of courts that have considered

the validity of the workmen's compensation set-off provision. Booth v. Seabord

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1970); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Cahoon 252 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1971); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Larriva,

507 P.2d 997 (Ariz. App. 1978); Travelers Ins. Co. v. National Farmers Union
Property & Gas. Go., 480 S.W.2d 585 (Ark. 1972); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Hillyer, 509 P.2d 810 (Colo. App. 1978); Williams v. Buckelen, 246 So. 2d 58
(La. 1971); Brunmeier v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 208 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1978);
Sullivan v. Doe, 495 P.2d 198 (Mont. 1972); Peterson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 288 Ore. 106, 893 P.2d 651 (1964); Ferguson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins.
Go.,871198(Tex.
S.E.2d
S.W.2d
Civ. 522
App.(S.C.
1972).1978); Fidelity & Gas. Co. v. McMahon, 487
Decisions contrary to Steinhaeufel that have held the workmen's compensation set-off provision valid have followed a strict substituted coverage rationale

and have been in jurisdictions where the workmen's compensation carrier is
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Steinhaeufel is indicative of a definite trend in Missouri towards
expanding uninsured motorist coverage beyond its niggardly $10,000/$20,000
legislative minimums by invalidating various set-off clauses.42 Although this
is certainly a worthy objective, it is productive of much litigation and uncertainly of coverage. The best approach would be for the legislature to
delineate explicitly those set-offs which should be allowed and require that
insurance companies make uninsured motorist coverage readily available
to the public with protection in excess of $10,000/$20,000 limits (upon43payment of a suitable additional premium), at the option of the insured.
WnLLIAm F. KoFicSDORF

subrogated to the rights of the insured against the tortfeasor. Jarrett v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 804, 26 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1962) (no uninsured motorist
statute in effect); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla.
App. 1966), cert. denied, 196 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967), Ullman v. Wolverine Ins.
Co., 269 N.E.2d 295 (I1. 1970), Niekamp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 2d
864, 202 N.E.2d 126 (1964) (where no uninsured motorist statute was in effect);
Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Mesner, 2 Mich. App. 350, 189 N.W.2d 913 (1966);
Hackman v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 261 A.2d 483 (N.H. 1970); Durant v.
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemn. Corp., 15 N.Y.2d 408, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
42. See note 10 supra.
43. The stacking issue has been faced squarely by the state legislatures in
Iowa and Tennessee, where statutes expressly incorporate the substituted coverage
theory to avoid stacking. IowA CODE ANN. § 516A.2 (1967) says:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as requiring forms
of coverage provided pursuant hereto, whether
alone orliability
in combination
or motor
with similar coverage fforded under other automobile
vehicle liabilift policies, to afford limits in excess of those that would be
afforded had he insured thereunder been involved in an accident with
a motorist who was insured under a policy of liability insurance with the
minimum limits for bodily injury or death prescribed in Subsection 10 of
Section 321A.1. Such forms of coverage may include terms, exclusions,
limitations, conditions, and offsets which were designed to avoid duplication of insurance or other benefits.
The Tennessee provision is similar. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1152 (1967).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE GOVERNOR'S ITEM VETO POWER
State ex rel. Cason v. Bond1
The 77th General Assembly of the State of Missouri adopted an appropriation bill, Conference Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 16
(hereinafter C.C.S.H.B. 16), which provided funds for emergency and
supplemental purposes. The bill was sent to Governor Bond, who on April 3,
1973, signed and returned the bill to the legislature, but only after making
partial vetoes of certain sections. Accompanying the bill was the Governor's
explanation in his veto message to the House of Representatives. The partial
vetoes were made by striking language that designated the purpose of the
appropriations without vetoing the sum appropriated. 2
Relators, asserting standing as taxpayers and as members of the 77th
General Assembly,3 sought from the Missouri Supreme Court a writ of
mandamus 4 directing the authorization or issuance of warrants5 for the

1. 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
2. Id. at 387-88. The Governors partial vetoes involved §§ 16.490-.520 of
C.C.S.H.B. 16. The following sections of C.C.S.H.B. 16 are examples.

Section 16.500. To the Office of Administration
For Capitol Building Renovation (W/est-SideFrom General Revenue ..............................................
$1,100,000.00
Section 16.500. I hereby veto and delete from Section 16.500 the words
"(West Side)" for the reason that the renovation needs of the Capitol
Building are not limited to the West Side.
Section 16.520. To the Department of Agriculture
For payment to-he-elewiag-eempanie for work performed in connection with the 1972 State Fair and necessary operational expenses

t -T - dLawAibeh-P

4
...........................................
$ ,92 .*ng
-- Hea~ig.............................88&49-

ee -E
ie .....................................................
: 6.- 1-88-998.0&
-...................
From General Revenue ...................................................
$130,942.68
From State Fair Fees Fund ................................................
40,448.00
Total .................................................................
$171,390.68"
Section 16.520. I hereby veto and delete from Section 16.520 the words
"to the following compAnies"; "from March 1 thru June 30, 1973
Danville Tent and Awning ................................................
$ 15,192.58
Lamberth Plumbing and Heating ...........................................
30,840.49
Queen City Electric ......................................................
45,916.61
Operation (from March 1 thru June 30, 1973) ...........
38,993.00";
and "(from March 1 thru June 80, 1973)" for the reason that such
language is unnecessary.
3. The Court found that the relators had standing as taxpayers to maintain
the action and, therefore, did not address itself to the question whether the
relators would have standing as members of the General Assembly. 495 S.W.2d
at 386.
4. Mandamus is available to compel an official to perform a ministerial duty
which it is his clear legal duty to perform. 18 U.K.C.L. REX. 173 (1950). See
also State ex. rel. Hixson v. Nerry, 105 Mo. App. 458, 79 S.W.993 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1904).
5. Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 28 (1972 amend.) states:
No money shall be withdrawn from the state treasury except by warrant
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expenditures under the appropriation bill. The application for the writ
requested that the warrants be limited to the purposes as specified by the
77th General Assembly and that no effect be given to the Governor's
deletions in his partial veto. 6
The office of Commissioner of Administration, who must certify all
warrants for expenditures before money can be withdrawn from the state
treasury,7 was vacant. Pursuant to Missouri law,8 the Governor assumed that
office. Therefore relators named as respondents Governor Bond in his position as Acting Commissioner of Administration, State Treasurer Spainhower, 9 and Governor Bond in his official position as Governor. No relief
was sought against Governor Bond in the latter capacity.10
In holding that the partial veto was a nullity, the Missouri Supreme
Court concluded that mandamus would lie against the Governor in his
capacity as Acting Commissioner of Administration, that the power of the
Governor to veto an appropriation bill was limited, and that the effect of
an invalid partial veto was that the bill becomes law as if the Governor
had approved it in toto. These three aspects of the decision are discussed
below.
Respondents questioned whether the Missouri Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought against Governor Bond as Acting
Commissioner of Administration,' contending that mandamus did not lie
because its issuance would violate the separation of powers doctrine. 12
The established rule in Missouri was that mandamus would not lie
against the Governor, even if the duty was ministerial and one that could
have been assigned to another officer who would be amenable to the
court's process.' 3 The rationale is that the duty is nevertheless an official

drawn in accordance with an appropriation made by law, nor shall any
obligation for the payment of money be incurred unless the commissioner
of administration certifies it for payment ....
6. 495 S.W.2d at 886.
7. MO. CONST. art IV, § 28 (1972 amend.).

8. § 26.800 (9), LAws of 1971.
9. See §§ 30.160, .180, .410, RSMo 1969.
10. 495 S.W.2d at 886. The writer found no explanation why relators named
Governor Bond as Governor but sought no relief against him in that capacity.
Perhaps the relators named him before discovering that mandamus will not lie
against the Governor as Governor. See State ex. rel. Robb v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428,
25 S.W. 376 (1894).
11. Brief for Respondents at 10-15, State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d

885 (Mo. En Bane 1978).
12. MO. CONsT. art. II, §1.

13. Mandamus will not lie against the Governor, State ex rel. Bartley v.
Fletcher, 89 Mo. 888 (1867), even for the performance of a ministerial duty.
State ex rel. Robb v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428, 25 S.W. 376 (1894).

In State ex rel. Donnell v. Osburn, 347 Mo. 469, 147 S.W.2d 1065, 1070

(En Bane 1941), the court interpreted Robb:
There we refused to issue mandamus against the governor on the ground
that the performance or nonperformance of every duty placed upon the
governor, who has 'supreme executive power,' involved the exercise of

executive duty with which this court could not interfere.

The court in the instant case reiterated Donnell's interpretation of Robb: "The
Robb decision was interpreted later by this Court in the Donnell case, supra, as
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duty of the Governor, 14 and the performance or nonperformance of every
duty placed on the Governor involves the exercise of executive duty with
which the courts cannot interfere. 15 Here, relief was sought against the
Governor acting as an executive officer against whom mandamus will normally lie. 16 Although there was authority to the contrary,1 the court established a limited exception to the general
rule by holding that it had jurisdic8
tion to issue the writ of mandamus.'

meaning that mandamus would not lie against the Governor where it would interfere with the exercise of executive duty and discretion." 495 S.W.2d at 389. The
latter quote might be interpreted to mean that mandamus will lie against the
Governor for the performance of a ministerial duty. This seemingly small linguistic
change may have been necessary for the supreme court to find that it had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against the Governor as Acting Commissioner
of Administration; it is, however, a complete reversal from Robb and Donnell.
There is no other indication that Robb is not good law, and to say that mandamus
would not lie against the Governor where it would interfere with the exercise of
executive duty and discretion could mean that mandamus will not issue against
the Governor at all, because, according to Robb and Donnell, every duty placed
on the governor involves the exercise of executive duty with which the court will
not interfere. See Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. Rep. 103, 18 Am. Rep. 880 (1872);
Annot., 105 A.L.R. 1124 (1986).
14. State ex rel. Robb v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428, 25 S.W. 876 (1894).
15. State ex rel. Donnell v. Osburn, 347 Mo. 469, 147 S.W.2d 1065 (En
Banc 1941).
16. See State ex rel. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Howard, 857 Mo. 802, 208 S.W.2d
247 (En Banc 1947).
17. State ex rel Robb v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428, 25 S.W. 876 (1894). J. HIGH,
A TREATISE ox ExTRAnoroDNAny LEGAL Rmrnms § 120 (8d ed. 1896), states:
fT] he chief executive of the state is, as to the performance of any and
all official duties, entirely removed from the control of the courts, and
that he is beyond the reach of mandamus, not only as to duties of a
strictly executive or political nature, but even as to purely ministerial
acts whose performance the Legislature may have required at his hands.
In Huidekoper v. Hadley, 177 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1910), it was held that mandamus
would not lie against the Governor of Missouri as a member of the State Board of
Equalization. This case was not cited in State ex rel. Cason v. Bond.
In deciding that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus the Court
cited State ex rel. Donnell v. Osburn, 847 Mo. 469, 147 S.W.2d 1065 (En Banc
1941), which held that mandamus would lie against the speaker of the House of
Representatives for the performance of a ministerial duty without violating the
separation of powers doctrine. The Court also cited State ex inf. Barrett ex rel.
Bradshaw v. Hedrich, 294 Mo. 21, 241 S.W. 402 (En Banc 1922), to show that
State ex rel. Robb v. Stone, 120 Mo. .428, 25 S.W. 876 (1894), which held that
mandamus would not lie against the Governor, did not apply to cases between
persons other than the Governor wherein the validity of acts of the Governor are
determined. 495 S.W.2d at 889. The Court did not acknowledge that the case
before it was not such a case, but instead was a case between persons including
the Governor as Acting Commissioner of Administration.
18. 495 S.W.2d at 889. See State ex inf. Barrett ex rel. Bradshaw v. Hedrick,
294 Mo. 21 241 S.W. 402 (En Banc 1922); Dennett, Petitioner, 82 Me. 508, 54
Am. Dec. 602 (1858); State ex rel. Latture v. Frazier, 114 Tenn. 516, 86 S.W.
819 (1904); Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. Rep. 103, 18 Am. Rep. 880 (1872). For a
general discussion of whether mandamus should lie against the Governor see
Annot., 105 A.L.R. 1124 (1936).
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The court next dealt with the merits, namely, whether article IV, section
26 of the Missouri Constitution19 authorized the Governor's deletion of
language stating the purposes of the appropriations. 20 The early constitutions
of Missouri authorized the Governor to make general vetoes of legislation
only,2 but the 1875 Constitution gave him item veto power.22 This power is
now expressed in article IV, section 26 of the constitution,23 which provides
that the Governor may veto one or more items or portions of items of an
appropriation bill while approving other portions of the bill. A majority of
the states have adopted similar constitutional provisions.24 The original
purpose of such constitutional provisions was to avoid the practice of adding
to an appropriation bill legislation unrelated to the appropriation of public
moneys. 25 Today, the purpose of the Missouri provision is to give the
Governor tighter control over expenditures of public funds. 28
Seemingly, the term "items or portions of items of appropriation" is
unambiguous, but the quantity of litigation in other jurisdictions belies that
premise. 27 A leading case is In re Opinion of the Justices,28 in which it was
stated that "items" or "parts of items" referred to separable fiscal units. 29
The Massachusetts court decided that the Governor's item veto power did
not allow him to strike conditional language and leave the sum appropriated
intact.3 0 In Commonwealth v. Dodson3l the Virginia Supreme Court defined
19. Mo. CONsT. art. IV, § 26:
The governor may object to one or more items or portions of items of
appropriation of money in any bill presented to him, while approving
other portions of the bill. On signing it he shall append to the bill a
statement of the items or portions of items to which he objects and such
items or portions shall not take effect.
See also §26.030, RSMo 1969: "The governor may veto any item or portion of
any item of any appropriation bill or the whole theref.. .. "
20. See note 2 supra. For a complete seriatim of Governor Bond's partial
vetoes of §§ 16.490-.510 of C.C.S.H.B. 16 see 495 S.W.2d at 387-88.
21. MO. CONS'r. art. IV, § 10 (1820); Mo. CONST. art. V, § 9 (1865).
22. MO. CONST. art. V, § 18 (1875).
23. See note 19 supra.
24. Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 81 TE.n'T. L.Q. 27
(1957); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 600 (1925).
25. See Beckman, supra note 24. This practice should no longer be a problem
in Missouri because the inclusion of legislation of a general character in an
appropriation bill is unconstitutional. Mo. CoNsT. art. III, § 23; State ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo. 121, 113 S.W.2d 783 (En Bane 1937); cert. granted
305 U.S. 580, rev'd on other grounds, 305 U.S. 837 (1938); State ex rel. Davis v.
Smith, 385 Mo. 1069, 75 S.W.2d 828 (En Bane 1934).
26. MO. CoNsT. art. IV, § 27; 18 DRAxE L. R v. 245, 258 (1969).
27. See Beckman, supra note 24, at 28; 2.5 GEO. L.J. 106, 181 (1936);
Annot, 5 A.L.R. 600 (1925).
A8.
t.94
Mass. 616, N.E.2d 789 (1936).
29.
No power is conferred to change the items of an appropriation except by
reducing the amount thereof. Words or phrases are not "items or parts
of items." This principle applies to the conditions attached to the appropriation now in question. The condition is not an item or a part of an
item.
Id. at 620, 2 N.E.2d at 790.
80. Id. at 621, 2 N.E.2d at 791.
31. 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120 (1940).
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"item" as something that may be taken out of a bill without affecting its
other purposes or provisions; something that may be lifted bodily from
instead of cut out of an appropriation bill.3 2 The Governor's veto power, the
court concluded, does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions
or restrictions- that would be legislating.3 3 The court said that an "item" in
or condition; it
an appropriation bill is something different from a provision
34
is an indivisible sum of money for a stated purpose.
5
The Missouri court held that the Governor's item, or separable sum,3
veto power does not include authority to strike words stating the purpose
of the appropriation,3 6 adopting the principle that conditional language
directing how a specific sum shall be spent cannot be stricken without
vetoing the appropriation of the specific sum. 37 The Court noted that the
38
Governor was participating in the legislative process and said that any
in its favor. 39
resolved
be
should
power
legislature's
the
doubt regarding
The Governor does have the power, the court acknowledged, to veto individual items in a lump40 sum appropriation bill, but only if he reduces the
lump sum accordingly.

32. Id. at 290, 11 S.E.2d at 124.
language
conditional
vetoofof "items"
ThetheGovernor's
127. be
S.E.2d
33. Id. at 296, 11bill
of
or "parts
disapproval
wouldat not
of anappropriation
items, but would be affirmative legislation. Fitzsimmons v. Leon, 141 F.2d 886
(1st Cir. 1944).
84. 176 Va. at 296, 11 S.E.2d at 127.
35. The court defined "item"' as a separable sum. 495 S.W.2d at 892.
36. Id. See State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d
141 (Iowa 1971), where the Iowa Supreme Court stated that a provision of an
appropriation bill which required that the permanent resident engineer's office
remain in its present location was an "item" subject to the Governor's item veto
power because it did not direct the use of moneys appropriated. See also Brown
v. Fergusen, 32 Ohio St. 2d 245, 291 N.E.2d 434, (1972).
37. Id. See Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 214 P. 319 (1923); Miller v.
Walley, 122 Miss. 521, 84 So. 466 (1920); Fulmore v. Lane, 104 Tex. 499, 140
S.W. 405 (1911); State ex rel. Teachers & Officers v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158, 23 So.
643 (1898).
38. 495 S.W.2d at 892. See State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker, 290 Mo. 560, 235
S.W. 1017 (En Banc 1921).
39. Brown v. Morris, 865 Mo. 946, 290 S.W.2d 160 (1956); Bobrer v. Toberman, 360 Mo. 244, 227 S.W.2d 719 (En Banc 1950).
40. 495 S.W.2d at 392. See Commonwealth v. Dodsen, 176 Va. 281, 11
S.E.2d 120 (1940); In re Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 616, 2 N.E.2d 789
(1936); State ex Tel. Teachers & Officers v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158, 23 So. 643

(1898).

In Green v.Rawls, 122 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1960), the court upheld the veto
of a lesser sum which was included in the lump sum appropriated without reduction of the lump sum by an equal amount. In Reardon v. Riley, 76 P.2d 101
(Cal. 1938), the court upheld the Governor's veto of specific items and the reduction of the lump sum appropriated by a lesser amount than the total of the vetoed
items. Two other California cases allow the Governor to veto smaller included
items of a lump sum and leave the lump sum appropriated intact. Pomeroy v.
Riley, 12 Cal. 2d 166, 82 P.2d 697 (1938); R.R. Commn. v. Riley, 12 Cal. 2d
54, 82 P.2d 394 (1938). In Regents v. Trapp, 28 Okla. 83, 113 P. 910 (1911),
the court stated that the Governor must approve or disapprove the lump sum
appropriation and may not veto any of the smaller included items even if he
would reduce the lump sum appropriation by an equal amount.
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The final question in the case is the effect of an invalid item veto. Does
the bill become law as if the Governor had approved it in its entirety,
or does the entire bill fail because it lacks the Governor's approval? The
majority of jurisdictions hold, based on the public interest in the appropriation,41 that an invalid veto is a nullity and the appropriation bill passes as
if the Governor had approved the entire bill.42 A minority holds that the
bill does not become law because there is no concurrence of approval
between the Governor and the legislature.48 Although the Missouri Constitu44
tion requires that the Governor approve all bills passed by both houses,
4
the court stated that the Governor's veto was unauthorized and a nullity. 5
By issuing the writ of mandamus, the Court allowed C.C.S.H.B.
16 to
46
become law as if the Governor had approved the entire bill.
To conclude, the item veto is limited to vetoing both a specific sum
and its stated purpose. This result accords with the general trend of state
decisions. 47 Perhaps a different view of what constitutes an "item or portions of items" of appropriation would promote the constitutional policy of
greater executive control over public expenditures.48 Yet, the view expressed
by the Missouri Supreme Court does uphold the concept of the Governor's
veto power as only a negative one,49 and not including the power to enact
legislation. 0 This is proper because it is within the legislature's discretion
to determine the best use of public funds. 51
JAMES M. VAUGHAN

41. Beckman, supranote 24, at 84.
42. White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 25 Ariz. 881, 218 P. 139 (1923);
Porter v. Hughes, 4 Ariz. 1, 32 P. 165 (1893); Wheeler v. Gallet, 43 Idaho 175,
249 P. 1067 (1926); State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n., 186
N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 1971); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 616, 2
N.E.2d 789 (1936); Wood v. State Administrative Board, 255 Mich. 220, 288
N.W. 16 (1931); Peebly v. Children, 95 Okla. 40, 217 P. 1049 (1923); Carter v.
Rathburn, 85 Okla. 251, 209 P. 944 (1922); Fulmore v. Lane, 104 Tex. 499,
140 S.W. 405 (1911); Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 48 A.
976 (1901); Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120 (1940).
48. State ex rel. Teachers & Officers v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158, 23 So. 648
(1898); Mills v. Porter, 69 Mont. 325, 222 P. 428 (1924); State ex rel. Finnegan
v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 662 (1936) (the bill under consideration
was not an appropriation).
44. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 31.
45. 495 S.W.2d at 893.
46. Id. at 894.
47. 50 HAnv. L. REv. 848, 844 (1937).
48. Mo. CoNsT. art. IV, § 27.

49. See Brown v. Morris, 865 Mo. 946, 290 S.W.2d 160 (En Banc 1956).
50. Fitzsimmons v. Leon, 141 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1944).
51. Motley v. Callaway County, 847 Mo. 1018, 149 S.W.2d 875 (1941).
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USURY-LIMITING THE TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL
SALE EXCEPTION
Lucas v. Beco Homes, Inc.'

Madison and Lora Lucas agreed to purchase a surplus home from Beco
Homes, Inc., and to borrow $1,000 for the costs of reconstructing it on their
lot. The total invoice price was $3,214.80, of which $3,200 was to be
financed. Pursuant to a prior agreement, Beco offered Delta Loan and
Finance Co. the Lucas's note for $5,411.17. Delta accepted and discounted
the note for a charge of $1,251.44. The balance of the amount was distributed as follows: a dealer reserve held by Delta for Beco of $901.07;2
purchase of credit life insurance for $378.77; a check to Delta for $1,880,
which represented existing indebtedness to Delta from Beco; and two
checks to Beco for $500, each representing one-half of the $1,000 construction loan. The home was delivered, but the Lucas's never received the
$1,000 construction loan. The home was left unassembled and deteriorated
from exposure.
After making 59 payments totaling $3800.70, the Lucas's attempted to
abandon the transaction, alleging a conspiracy betwen Beco and Delta and
usurious interest charges. The trial court found that there was no conspiracy
and that Delta was a holder in due course, but that the loan was usurious.
The court allowed recovery of all payments in excess of $3,712 (the principal
and a legal rate of interest).3 In addition, the court enjoined Delta and Beco
from further collection or foreclosure on the security.4 On appeal, Delta
argued that the trial court's finding of usury was erroneous because the
transaction was a time price differential sale to which usury statutes are
inapplicable.
A time price differential sale has generally been considered an exception to usury statutes.5 It is defined as the difference between one price if
cash is paid and another, higher price if payment is deferred. The rationale
for the exception is that a seller is entitled to determine the price at which
he will sell and to demand a much greater price when payment is deferred."

1. 494 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. App., D. St L. 1973).
2. Defendant Beco described dealer reserve as money held back by Delta
and given to the dealer as profit when the contract is paid off. Id. at 421.
3.§ 408.020, RSMo 1969, allows creditors to receive interest of six percent
per annum when no other rate has been agreed on for moneys due and payable.
408.050, RSMo 1969, states that if the rate of interest is in excess of the legal
rate, any person collecting the usurious rate shall be liable for any sums paid in
excess of the principle and legal rate and also for court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees.
4. The note was secured by a quit claim deed on property owned by
plaintiffs and a bond for deed signed by Beco and plaintiffs.
5. Usury is defined as "the receiving, securing, or taking of a greater sum
or value for the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or things in action than is
allowed at law." 55 AM. Jun. Usury § 2 (1946); see § 408.050, RSMo 1969.
6. Willard, Finance Charges or Time Price Differntialin Installment SalesUsury?, 24 Mo. L. BRv. 225 (1959).
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For usury purposes courts have therefore distinguished between a sale and
a loan of money. This distinction was viable when consumers with little
bargaining power utilized loans to secure bare necessities. With the advent
of mass consumer credit, however, consumers utilize credit sales, not short
term loans, to obtain their necessities.7 Often the consumer does not have
parity of bargaining power in these transactions." Thus, there is much less
justification today for distinguishing sales from loans for usury purposes.
Until the early 1950's the courts of most states, including Missouri, 9
applied the time price exception 10 almost universally if the transaction was
a bona fide sale and not, in substance, a loan for forbearance. 1 Courts are
a
now increasingly finding that a time price differential sale does involve
2
loan or forbearance and is therefore subject to the usury statutes.1
Courts have used a variety of theories to hold the usury statutes applicable without abandoning the time price exception. Some courts have
restricted the exception to time price differential sales as conducted when
the exception was formulated over a hundred years ago.' 3 Other courts have
limited the exception by establishing a series of tests to determine whether
a transaction is in reality a loan or forbearance."4 One test holds that if the
credit price is based on a cash price plus a percentage of the cash price, the
contract is in essence an agreement to forbear."' Another test looks for a
7. 48 WAsu. L. REv. 479 (1978).
8. Id.

9. Wyatt v. Commercial Credit Corp., 341 S.W.2d 348 (K.C. Mo. App.
1960); General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Propst, 289 S.W.2d 508 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1951); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68,
262 S.W. 425 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
10. The exception was established in 1861 by the United States Supreme
Court in Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, (1861), in which the Court
said:

[Ilf A propose to sell to B a tract of land for $10,000 cash, or for

$20,000 payable in 10 annual installments, and if B prefers to pay the
larger sum to gain time, the contract cannot be called usurious. A vendor
may prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expectancy, and a pur-

chaser may prefer the greater price with the longer credit; and one...
may say, with apparent truth, that B pays a hundred per cent for forbearance ....

but.., the conclusion is manifestly erroneous.

Id. at 118-19.
11. E.g., in White v. Anderson, 164 Mo. App. 132, 147 S.W. 1122 (K.C.

Ct. App. 1912), the plaintiff sold coupon books worth $10 in merchandise at
certain stores tor the purchaser's note with five percent interest secured by a
chattel mortgage; the merchants then redeemed the coupons with merchandise
and charged them to plaintiff less a 10 percent discount. The court held that the
transaction was in substance a loan from plaintiff to purchaser, and not a sale
of credit.
12. 48 WAsir. L. REv. 479 (1973).
18. State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 142-43, 179 N.W.2d 641,
650 (1970).

14. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).

15. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973
(1952); Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944); Lloyd
v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963); Mitchell, Usury in Arkansas,
26 Arx. L. REV. 208 (1972).
In Lucas the credit price was obtained by adding the cash price of $3,200
to the discount required by Delta; this is arguably the equivalent of charging the
cash price plus a percent thereof.
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disclosure of two prices, one cash and one credit; a true opportunity to
choose between them is an indication that the sale is a true time price
differential. 16 Relevant indicia of a loan transaction are ambiguous charges, 17
like a dealer reserve or a handling or carrying charge, an extension of credit
on the basis of ability to pay,' 8 an absolute sale on delivery with the debt
20
as consideration,' 9 and sales tax computed and charged on the cash price.
Some state legislatures have attempted to limit the time price differential exception with statutes specifying the maximum price differential. 2'
The effectiveness of some of these statutes has been substantially reduced
22
where they do not extend to the seller's assignee.
An Arkansas case, Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp.,2 3 has led
to a major limitation of the time price exception: Where there is a close
relationship between the seller and finance company, several courts 24 have
found there is a loan or forbearance between the finance company and the
buyer. This relationship will likely be established if one or more of the
16. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952); State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
17. 494 S.W.2d at 423, 424.
18. State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970);
Annot., 14 A.L.R.8d 1065 (1967).
19. State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
20. Id.
21. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 45.204-.208 (1968); N.J. REv. STAT. § 17:16C
(1970). Missouri's Retail Credit Act, § 408.300, RSMo 1969, establishes a maximum time price differential in certain retail consumer sales but allows a higher
rate than the usury statutes.
22. In Missouri, a note given to evidence a retail sales contract is negotiable
and the assignee, if a bolder in due course, is not subject to the buyer's personal
defenses. § 408.260(1), RSMo 1969. See also Eldridge, The Holder-in-Due
Course Concept and the Installment Buyer of Consumer Goods, 86 U.M.K.C.L.
REv. 368 (1968).
23. 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952). The court said:
(1) We leave unimpaired the doctrine that the seller may, in a bona fide
transaction, increase the price to compensate for the risk that is involved
,in a credit sale. But there may be a question of fact, as to whether the
so-called credit price was bona fide as such, or only a cloak for usury.
(2) If the seller, whether he has quoted two prices to the purchaser or
not, subsequently transfers the title documents to an individual or company which is engaged in the business of purchasing such documents,
at a price which permits the transferee to obtain more than a return of
ten percent on its investment, then a question of fact arises as to whether
the seller increased his cash price with the reasonable assurance that he
could so discount the paper to such individual or finance company. If
that reasonable assurance existed, then the transaction is in substance a
loan, and may be attacked for usury.
(3) When the finance companies or purchasers of title paper supply
dealers with a set of forms and a schedule for credit price increases, sueZ
will tend to show that the dealer had reasonable assurance that such
finance company or purchaser . . . would take the paper at discount.
Id. at 609, 249 S.W.2d at 978.
24. State ex. rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., Inc. 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa,
1973); Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944); Lloyd v.
Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963); Rollinger v. J.C. Penney Co.,
192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971); State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179
N.W.2d 641 (1970).
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following elements are present: The finance company supplies forms and
rate charts to the seller; 25 a particular finance company agrees to take all
of a seller's commercial paper; 26 the seller allows the finance company to
approve the credit application before making the sale;27 or the seller
immediately assigns both the note and the sales contract to the finance company.28 Before Lucas Missouri courts had held that the relationship between
the seller and the finance company did not, in and of itself, render the
transaction a usurious loan or forbearance, even if the finance company
agrees in advance to accept the note and supplies the forms and the seller
bases the time price differential rates on the discount the finance company
will charge. 20 Lucas, however, held that the transaction was a loan instead
of a true time price differential sale 0 and based its decision on the "whole
interlocking relationship" between Delta and Beco.31
A related area in which the time price differential exception is applied
is revolving charge accounts. Large department stores and motor oil companies, for example, charge one and one-half percent per month interest on
unpaid balances. Some courts have held that these transactions are not
within the time price differential exception and that the agreement amounts
to a forbearance on a debt created when the customer charges an item.32
Other courts have reaffirmed the application of the exception to revolving
charges, either because they fear the repercussions of changing the rule3 3 or
because they believe it is for the legislature to make changes in the usury
34
statute.
Lucas also raises the question whether usury is a defense against a
holder in due course. 5 The purpose of the holder in due course concept is
to allow commercial paper to flow freely by protecting a holder who takes
for value, in good faith, and without knowledge, from defenses that would
be good against the seller.3 6 This purpose is not served in a transaction in
which the seller, by prearrangement, immediately assigns the note and conditional sales contract to a finance company. Most states, including Missouri,

25. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952).
26. Id.
27. Id. See also National Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen, 80 Wash. 2d 406,
495 P.2d 332 (1972).
28. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952).
29. Cases cited note 9 supra.
30. 494 S.W.2d at 424.
31. 494 S.W.2d at 423. Although this approach has generally been limited
to those cases where the note and the contract were actually assigned to a finance
company, there are indications that the transaction may be usurious even without
the transfer. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck &Co., 228 Ark. 404, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957).
32. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 404, 808 S.W.2d 802 (1957);
State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973);
Rollinger v. J.C. Penney Co., 192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971); State v. J.C. Penney
Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
83. Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 446 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. 1969).
34. Sliger v. R.H. Macy &Co., 59 N.J. 465, 283 A.2d 904 (1971).
35. 494 S.W.2d at 424.
36. § 400.3-302, RSMo 1969.
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have cases where a court has found that the close relationship between
seller and finance company implies bad faith and refuse to extend the
immunity of a holder in due course to the finance company.3 7 Even without
the implication of bad faith courts increasingly find that the finance company is not a "stranger" to the transaction and thus is not entitled to the
status of a holder in due course.38 The required relationship between seller
and finance company is established for this purpose by
the same analysis
39
used in regard to the time price differential exception.
Some states have attempted to deal with the holder in due course
problem through legislation. 40 By adopting the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, or specific legislation aimed at the problem, 40 a these states essentially
abolish the concept of the holder in due course,41 subjecting, entirely 42 or
in part,4 3 the assignee to claims and defenses valid against the assignor-seller.
Although the court in Lucas did not disturb the trial court's finding
that Delta was a holder in due course, it doubted that Delta was entitled
to that status.44 The issue was irrelevant, however, in view of the court's
holding that "the general rule is that usury is a defense against a holder
in due course to the extent that a statute declares a transaction usurious as
to the excess interest."45 This statement of the general rule is of doubtful

87. Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer

Paper, 1958 WAmS.

U.L.Q. 177; 42 CoLo. L. REv. 489 (1970). In Missouri the

court will not imply bad faith unless the degree of involvement is extreme, i.e.,
where the purchaser is clearly being swindled. See Morbrose Inv. Co. v. Flick,
187 Mo. App. 528, 174 S.W. 189 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).

88. Anderson v. Curls, 309 S.W.2d 692 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958); Taylor v.

Atlas Security Co., 218 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (K.C. Ct. App. 1923).

89. See note 28 and text accompanying notes 28-81 supra. The courts look
to whether the finance company supplies forms and rate charts (often containing
a printed assignment on the back), makes a credit evaluation before the sale is
made, has an arrangement to accept all the notes of a particular seller, or accepts
the instrument immediately after its execution. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,

199 Ark. 1073, 187 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
40. Missouri.now has before the legislature a bill that would eliminate the

doctrine of the bolder in due course in Missouri. S. 556, H. 1047, 77th General

Assembly, 1st Sess. (1974).

40a. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50541 (1968); IDAo CODE § 48-609 (1972); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN.tit. II, § 8-802(5) (1964); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255,
§ 12c (1968); MwN. LAws 1971, Ch. 275; N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:16C-64.1 to
-64.4 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 9, § 2455 (1966).
41. UNIFORM CONSUMER CnRmIT CODE § 2.408 states: "In a consumer credit
sale or consumer lease ... the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee."
In addition, UNwuoima CONSUmER CnRwrr CODE § 2.408, Comment states: [P]rofessional financers buying consumer paper will normally not qualify as holders in
due course with respect to instruments taken by dealers in violation of this section
and negotiated to them."
See also Working Re-draft No. 4 § 3.807 (1972). To date, seven states have
adopted the UNIwoRM CowmmcAL. CREDrr CODE: Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming.
42. UNnoRvom CONSUm CREDrr CODE § 2.404, alternative A.
48. UNironm¢ CONSUMER CPDrr CODE § 2.404, alternative B.
44. 494 S.W.2d at 424.

45. Id.
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validity.40
Nevertheless, Lucas indicates a willingness of the court of appeals to
limit the protection the holder in due course traditionally enjoys and to use
a more realistic analysis of time price differential sales. In evaluating further
changes in the latter area the Missouri courts should consider the problems
of retroactivity and the legal interest rate. A staggering amount of litigation
could arise if major limitations on the time price exception (e.g., excluding
revolving charges) operate retroactively. Another consideration is that Missouri's legal interest rates, at six7 and eight4 8 percent, are particularly low
and have already made financing difficult to obtain. If applied to all condi49
tional and credit sales the legislature might be compelled to increase them.
SUsA W. MULLE

46. Under the UurFonm COMMERCIAL CODE usury is a defense against a
holder in due course only if the effect of the statute is to make the entire transaction null and void. UNonRM COM MRCIAL CODE § 3-305, comment 6; see also
11 Am. Jutr. 2D Bills and Notes § 678 (1963). Kelly v. Industrial Operating Co.,
829 Mo. 629, 46 S.W.2d 181 (1932), cited in Lucas to support its statement of
the law, did not hold the defense good against a holder in due course, but instead
held that the defendant was not a holder in due course and that the defense was
therefore good against him.
47. § 408.020, RSMo 1969.
48. § 408.030, RSMo 1969.
49. Missouri's Retail Credit Act, § 408.300, RSMo 1969, limits the amount
of finance charges on some retail credit sales, but the rates allowed are lower than
that on most revolving charges.
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